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Abstract 
This paper investigates the bargaining power of dockworkers with relation to 
their key role within global trade. Through an analysis of their structural 
bargaining power, assessing their importance to global production chains and 
their scarcity as a trade, the paper concludes that the recent trends of global 
trade have both posed major threats toward dockworkers that have decreased 
their bargaining power, and have provided them new advantages that have at 
the same time increased their bargaining power. The analysis of the 
dockworkers’ associational bargaining power, assessing their organisation and 
how this organisation has helped them wielding their advantages, builds on 
this finding and concludes that the strong organisation of dockworkers has 
been a pivotal reason to their ability of taking advantage of the recent trends. 
The paper builds further on these findings by discussing the effects of uneven 
developments and the possibilities for a global union strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction is the presentation of our paper. The chapter will thus 
include the problem area, which leads to the problem formulation and 
research questions. Lastly a clarification of the most important concepts used 
in the paper. 
 
1.1. Problem area 
Global trade is no longer merely a concept of goods being exported from 
country A to country B. The increasingly complex global dispersion of the 
production of one single good has arguably turned the world into one big 
assembly line, where a smartphone is designed in the United States, its 
touchscreen is produced in Germany, the assembly takes place in Taiwan, and 
the marketing again takes place in the United States (Mudambi 2008). This 
global assembly line – or the global value chain as the theoretical concept is 
termed – makes the transportation of goods a pivotal part of the capitalist 
world economy (Silver 2003: 97). 
Today, 80 percent of global merchandise trade by volume is carried by sea 
(UNCTAD 2013: xi), making the liner shipping industry, which accounts for 
about 60 percent of the value moved internationally by sea (worldshipping.org 
2014), an indispensable cog in the global trade machinery. 
The importance of liner shipping to the global economy makes the systems 
behind it as important. If the captain refuses to sail the ship, the goods will 
not be moved from the exporting country to the importing country or from 
one production country to the assembly country. The same goes for the 
loading and unloading of the ships, and this key role makes up the importance 
and thus the power of the dockworkers carrying out these tasks. The history 
provides good examples of dockworkers using their power in terms of strikes, 
campaigns, and messages of transnational solidarity (Silver 2003: 98-99), and 
together with the international organisation of transport workers in general 
(Silver 2003: 101-102), this points in the direction that their power is 
increasing. 
We are captivated by this power. Captivated by how a seemingly 
commodity typed profession has the power of suddenly stopping almost the 
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entire global assembly line and thus inflicting great bruises to the global 
economy. An important observation to make in this regard is that seven of the 
top ten container ports of the world are located in China, and the remaining 
three as well in the East (worldshipping.org 2014). 
Silver (2003) has divided workers’ bargaining power into associational and 
structural bargaining power. While associational bargaining power concerns 
the organisation of the workers, in our case through an international trade 
union federation, structural bargaining power concerns both the scarcity of 
the type of labour in question and the effect that, for instance, a strike will 
have on the production. We wish to use these analytical concepts in our 
analysis of dockworkers’ bargaining power, since it can be argued that 
dockworkers is one of the most international trades, and that their importance 
to the global production is of great significance, despite their lack of unique 
skills, since they can affect the whole maritime shipping and thus stop most of 
global trade. 
We will apply Silver’s framework to the analysis of dockworkers’ bargaining 
power. The associational bargaining power will be investigated through 
interviews with International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) – an 
international federation of national transport unions. ITF is relatively active 
when it comes to transnational solidarity actions. Whether that is due to the 
structural, associational power or a third factor is what we are hoping to 
uncover with the interviews. The structural bargaining power of dockworkers 
will be assessed by placing them within global value chains (GVCs) in order to 
understand their importance to the system (workplace bargaining power), 
and by unfolding the characteristics of the trade of dockworkers, including for 
instance the level of scarcity of dockworkers (marketplace bargaining 
power). 
This project will first look at the history of maritime shipping and ITF as an 
organisation in order to locate the trade of dockworkers and showcasing their 
historical importance in the global economy. On this basis we will deal with 
the bargaining power of dockworkers. We wish to investigate how their key 
role in the global trade system has affected their structural as well as their 
associational bargaining power; how the dockworkers have been able to wield 
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their advantages, and whether the role of the dockworkers has at the same 
time caused them disadvantages. 
This leads us to the following problem formulation: 
 
1.2. Problem formulation 
How has recent trends of global trade, with regard to maritime shipping, 
affected the bargaining power of dockworkers, and how has the organisation 
of dockworkers helped wielding the possible bargaining power? 
 
1.3. Research questions 
1. How have the recent trends within global trade affected the 
dockworkers’ structural bargaining power, and how have these effects 
come to show, in relation to the cases of the ports of the American West 
Coast and Hong Kong? 
2. How well are the dockworkers organised, with regard to International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, and what are their sources of 
associational bargaining power?  
 
1.4. Clarification of concepts 
This section will clarify how we define the most important concepts of the 
paper. Thus, the concepts may differ from how our empirical and theoretical 
sources have used them. 
 
1.4.1. Dockworkers and dockers 
Dockworkers and dockers will be used interchangeably throughout the paper, 
since they in ITF go by the name dockers, while they go by dockworkers in a 
lot of literature. In this section only the term dockworkers will be used, but it 
will refer to the concept of dockers as well.  
As the workers connected to the processes of loading and unloading have in 
recent times been dispersed over several different job categories (e.g. 
longshoremen/stevedores, crane operators, and clerical workers conducting 
the planning processes behind a computer), we have chosen to let the concept 
of dockworkers cover all these different job categories. The fact that the 
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employed dockworkers become increasingly high-skilled is an important 
development to this paper. Hence, crane operators and clerical workers are 
important to include in the analysis, as these occupations have replaced some 
of the former lower-skilled categories, for instance, longshoremen. However, 
as we do not know how our literature and interviewees use the concept of 
dockworkers it will inevitably become an elastic term. 
 
1.4.2. East and West 
The concepts of East and West are in this paper understood as the global East 
and West with a few demarcations. East thus refers to the emerging South 
East Asian economies, i.e. not Japan, while West refers to Western Europe 
and the North Americas. 
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2. Theory 
This chapter will outline the theories that we will be using when analysing the 
position of dockworkers in the global political economy and how this affects 
their bargaining power. The chapter will therefore include the following 
subchapters: Bargaining power, Global value chain analysis, Labour agency 
in global value chains, and The concept of solidarity and why it matters. 
 
2.1. Bargaining power 
In order to be able to analyse the position that the dockworkers are in, and 
what power this gives them, we will be using the theoretical concept of 
bargaining power and the subdivisions of this concept. 
 
Bargaining power is an important concept within the studies of labour in 
global political economy, in that it describes the power possessed by workers 
(employees) when facing their employers. However, power is an intangible 
asset that is often very difficult to measure. It is to this reason that we have 
chosen to use Erik Olin Wright’s subdivision of bargaining power into 
associational and structural power, as depicted by Beverly J. Silver (2003) in 
her book Forces of Labor. 
Associational power refers to the part of bargaining power that comes from 
the collective organisation of workers. An organisation that can take many 
forms (Silver 2003: 13). In this paper it will only be dealt with through the 
form of trade unions and federations. Thus, the strength of the trade unions 
and federations, of which the analysed dockworkers are members, plays an 
important role in determining the overall bargaining power of the 
dockworkers. 
Structural power, on the other hand, concerns the bargaining power of the 
workers merely as a result of their place in the economic system as well as in 
the labour market; how important are, for instance, dockworkers for the rest 
of the economic machinery to function, and how easily are they replaced by 
other dockworkers? In order to depict both these parts, structural power is 
further divided into two subtypes: marketplace bargaining power, which 
results from the labour market itself, and workplace bargaining power, 
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which results from the location of the workers in the economic machinery 
(Silver 2003: 13). 
The first of these two subtypes, marketplace bargaining power, can be 
measured through several different labour market observations within a single 
trade, including 1) the scarcity of the skills possessed by the workers of a 
certain trade, 2) the level of general unemployment, and 3) the ability of the 
workers to survive outside the labour market on nonwage sources of income. 
All of these conditions can enhance as well as weaken the bargaining power of 
a certain trade, since scare skills, low unemployment and the ability to survive 
outside the labour market for a long time all put the workers in a better 
position and vice versa (Silver 2003: 13). 
The other subtype, workplace bargaining power, is the part of the 
bargaining power concerning the place of the workers in the economic system; 
will the rest of the economic production line stop, if one type of workers 
within the line stops working, or can the production line somewhat easily 
continue without them (Silver 2003: 13)? A smartphone, for instance, cannot 
be finished if the workers making the touchscreen are on strike, but the trains 
can still continue moving passengers from A to B even though the ticket 
inspectors are on strike. Silver (2003: 13) provides the example of the railway 
workers’ enhanced workplace bargaining power in the light of corporations 
relying on just-in-time delivery of parts. This is a good example of the 
workplace bargaining power of transport workers, and the argument will 
further be investigated in the subchapter of analysis concerning the 
dockworkers’ structural bargaining power. 
 
2.2. Global value chain analysis 
In this subchapter we will unfold the theoretical concept of global value 
chains, because a global value chain analysis can help illuminating the role 
and importance of docks within the chain. This will further contribute to the 
analysis of the dockworkers’ importance to the global value chain as well as to 
the global economy, and thus benefit the analysis of their workplace 
bargaining power, a theoretical concept unfolded in the foregoing theoretical 
subchapter. 
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Simplified, shipping is what moves goods from producer to consumer. What 
moves bananas from Ecuador to Italy and finished smartphones from Taiwan 
to the United States. This simplified picture reveals an economic structure, 
where transportation is only one cog within a great machinery – but a cog that 
is truly necessary for the machinery to function. If the bananas cannot be 
shipped from the producers to the consumers, the demand will naturally stop, 
as the product cannot reach the consumers, and the production will 
consequently stop as well, making the whole chain collapse. 
This global chain, going from the beginning of the production to the end 
product being bought by the consumer, was first termed the global 
commodity chain (GCC) by Gary Gereffi as a global extension to the concept 
of commodity chain. Today, the term has evolved into the more fitting global 
value chain (GVC), due to the adding of services (Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 74), a 
theoretical term that describes a given product’s way from conception over 
production to end use. A GVC analysis thus provides a holistic view of the 
different steps that the product goes through, with the value added in each 
step. A GVC of a certain product can both be comprised of a single firm, 
controlling the whole chain, and comprised of several firms contributing to 
one or more steps each (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011: 4). 
GVCs contain four key dimensions: (1) an input-output structure, which 
maps the process that the product goes through; (2) a geographic scope, which 
places the different steps on a geographical map; (3) governance, which 
explains the power structures of the value chain; and (4) an institutional 
context, which unveils the different conditions of the different locales in the 
chain (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011: 4-12). 
Before going into a further elaboration of the four dimensions, it should be 
noted that GVC analysis will be used as a framework for the analysis, meaning 
that we will not engage in a normal GVC analysis where the GVC of a certain 
product is analysed. Instead we will merely use GVC analysis to illustrate how 
important dockworkers are to global production chains. Many of the concepts 
from GVC analysis will thus be adopted in this paper’s analysis of 
dockworkers’ structural bargaining power. More on this in the forthcoming 
theoretical section on why labour matters in GVC and again in the 
methodology. 
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The four following sections will outline each of the four dimensions and 
describe how and to which degree we will bring the dimensions with us to the 
analysis. 
 
2.2.1. Input-output structure 
The input-output structure is what makes up the chain in GVC analysis. As 
the name proscribes, it is an overview of what comes in to make the final 
outcome, the product. A chain is thus comprised of several parts that vary 
greatly from product to product (just think of how a banana is produced 
compared to a smartphone), but most industrial products will include 
research and design, inputs, production, shipping, distribution and 
marketing, and sales (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011). 
Our analysis will not be focusing on the GVC of one specific product, but 
instead on one part that is inherent in almost every GVC, namely the 
container ports loading and unloading the cargo before and after they are 
shipped. Therefore the input-output structure will be included in the analysis 
– not to describe the whole process of transformation from raw materials to 
final product, but to be able to identify and isolate the ports as a node within 
the GVC. 
 
2.2.2. Geographic scope 
The geographic scope is the part of the theoretical framework that focuses on 
where the different parts of the value chain take place. The geographical 
analysis of a smartphone would thus reveal a structure, where the beginning 
(research and design) and the end (sales, after-sales services) of the value 
chain are mainly located in the Western part of the world, and the middle 
(production and assembly) of the value chain is mainly located in the Eastern 
part of the world. 
The wide geographical dispersion of GVCs is what has made shipping an 
increasingly important part of the GVCs. Complex products, such as 
smartphones, having different parts added in different countries, is not merely 
shipped once from the factory to the retailer, but several times during the 
production. Therefore the wide geographical dispersion of GVCs is, so to 
speak, the very foundation of this paper. Furthermore, the fact that more and 
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more production takes place in the East, placing seven Chinese container 
ports in the top 10 of the biggest container ports in the world, is an important 
notion to our discussion, to which reason the geographic scope of GVCs is an 
important dimension to bear in mind through the analysis of this paper. 
 
2.2.3. Governance 
Governance is perhaps the most widely used and discussed dimension of GVC 
analysis, since governance as a tool can unveil the power structures of value 
chains. Governance thus determines the power relationships of a certain GVC 
that drive the flows of financial, material, and human resources within the 
chain (Gereffi & Fernandez-Strark 2011: 8; Gibbon & Ponte 2005). 
In its original form, governance would divide GVCs into two forms of power 
structures: buyer-driven and producer-driven. A buyer-driven chain is one 
that is mainly controlled by large retailers such as Wal-Mart or branded 
merchandisers such as Nike. Buyer-driven chains are most commonly seen in 
low technology, labour-intensive industries such as retailing, where the 
production does not require high levels of specialisation. Therefore, the 
geographic division of labour is often high (Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 79; Gereffi 
& Fernandez-Stark 2011: 8). 
Producer-driven chains are, in contrast, seen in high technology, capital-
intensive industries such as the automobile industry, where the production 
requires higher levels of specialisation. Therefore, producer-driven chains are 
more vertically integrated along the whole chain, as the production is not 
outsourced in the same scale as in buyer-driven chains, but often controlled 
entirely by one company, for instance Toyota. Producer-driven chains are 
often less geographically spread (Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 79; Gereffi & 
Fernandez-Stark 2011: 8). 
Today the understanding of power structures has become more complex, 
which has meant that five new categories of governance, building on buyer- 
and producer-driven, have overwritten the original two (Gereffi & Fernandez-
Stark 2011: 8). However, as we will not go into a deep analysis of the power 
structures, but merely use governance to identify the role of dockworkers 
within the chains, we find the original two categories of buyer- and producer-
driven sufficient for our analysis. 
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2.2.4. Institutional context 
The institutional context is used to identify the local, national, and 
international influences on the different steps of the value chains. As a GVC is 
spread across many countries, often located in different regions of the world, 
the local conditions can vary significantly from step to step. These conditions 
can, for instance, include the cost of labour together with its availability and 
skill level, taxes, and policies that can promote or hinder industrial growth. 
The identification of the institutional context of the GVC is made through a 
thorough mapping of the actors inside and outside influencing the chain and 
the role of these actors (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark 2011: 11). 
As the local conditions play an important role to where the largest 
container ports are located and under which flag container ships are flown, 
the institutional contexts as well play an important role to this paper, and 
therefore will be used in the analysis. The two analytical sections on the ports 
of the American West Coast and Hong Kong will briefly illustrate the 
institutional differences between countries. 
 
2.3. Labour agency in global value chains 
This theoretical subchapter will outline the theoretical concept of labour as 
put by Cumbers et al. and Silver. Hereafter the subchapter will explain the role 
of labour in GVC analysis in order to visualise how we will be using GVC 
analysis in our analysis. 
 
2.3.1. The concept of labour 
Labour is a disputed term. Here it will be understood both in an abstract 
sense and an institutional sense. Labour in the abstract sense refers to the 
work required to produce surplus value (Cumbers et al. 2008: 371), while 
labour, as institutional body, is the collective organisation of labour, which is 
often equated with the trade union. It could also be labour non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), global union federations (GUFs) or other more loose 
forms of labour networks. Labour, in both senses, is in a dialectic relation with 
capital. To Cumbers et al. (2008) this means that the social relations of 
production and the consequence of that, class conflict and resistance, should 
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be at the core of an analysis of capitalism and its spatial logic (Cumbers et al. 
2008: 372). The idea of labour and capital being in a dialectic relationship 
originates in the Marxist academic tradition. Labour from this perspective is 
given significant agency. 
Silver also points out that there is a relationship between the product cycle 
and the organisation of labour. When labour organises well there is a falling 
rate of profit, which capital responses to by relocating production, which has 
been termed by Harvey as a spatial fix (quoted in Cumbers et al. 2008) (Silver 
2003: 75-124). 
 
2.3.2. Why labour matters in GVC 
Without labour as a distinct category in a GVC analysis one can easily 
conclude that the interest of the owners of a particular firm in a value chain 
coincide with the workers’ interest of that same firm. Take for example the 
concept of social upgrading, which is 
 
derived from the ILO’s (see e.g. ILO: 1999) Decent Work Agenda, which seeks to 
comprehend and contribute to processes whereby workers can benefit from 
increased firm-level competitiveness […] It is argued that much still needs to be 
done to integrate work and workers into GCC/GVC and GPN frameworks [in 
order] to achieve meaningful improvements in workers’ conditions (Selwyn 2013: 
76). 
 
The point is that without the understanding of the dialectics between labour 
and capital, one can easily conclude that labour will get improved conditions, 
when a firm is doing well. However, having the dialectic relation in mind it 
becomes clear that if the firm is doing well, it might not necessarily lead to 
improved working conditions. While it might increase labour’s bargaining 
power, the actual outcome depends on the power relation. 
GVC analysis is often used to describe the features of a certain product’s 
way from the factory to the retailer. This paper, in contrast, focuses not on a 
product, but a certain node that is apparent in almost all GVCs: the container 
ports and the dockworkers working there. Therefore, this paper uses GVC 
analysis to identify the importance of container ports, and thus dockworkers, 
for the GVCs. GVC analysis is used in our analysis as a frame, rather than a 
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direct tool of analysis, to supplement the analysis of structural bargaining 
power. Structural bargaining power (through its subcategory workplace 
bargaining power) concerns the importance of a certain type of workers to the 
economic system that these workers serve. GVC analysis can help us enlighten 
this importance of dockworkers, as it will showcase them as a crucial node 
within the economic system. We will therefore adopt the concepts from GVC 
analysis and use them in our analysis of dockworkers’ structural bargaining 
power, as concepts such as governance and geographical dispersion can help 
us illuminate the importance of dockworkers to the global economy. 
 
2.4. The concept of solidarity and why it matters 
As we in the analysis of dockworkers’ associational bargaining power intend to 
investigate the aspects of dockworkers’ solidarity it is worth considering the 
term solidarity. It is essential for the paper to understand this concept for 
several reasons. 
First of all because solidarity is a term used by researchers, by the workers 
themselves, and by the unions (see for instance ITF’s website, where there is a 
tab called solidarity: http://www.itfglobal.org/solidarity/index.cfm). Also, as 
we shall see in the sections below, it matters a lot according to both the 
dockers and seafarers section. 
Secondly, solidarity is essential for successful collective action. In game 
theory the problem of freewheeling is a significant one. The problem can be 
summed up by the question: ‘why would you provide the sacrifice needed to 
achieve a certain aim, if the gains can be enjoyed by everyone?’ In labour 
struggle, improved conditions usually benefit the whole trade, therefore 
collective action can easily be undermined by the unwillingness to sacrifice 
time and effort, i.e. freewheeling. Solidarity is a way of overcoming that. 
Further, some are not in a position, where they can afford or are willing to 
(for whatever reason) give up time and resources, e.g. a day’s pay. In such a 
case they might seek to work anyway during a strike or even replace the 
striking workers. The problem of strike breakers or ‘scaps’ is not one of ‘just’ 
freewheeling. It actively diminishes the effect of the strike. Solidarity amongst 
the workers, and related groups that might be potential scabs, is essential in 
order to have a successful movement. 
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Thirdly, solidarity is essential in globalised production chains. As 
production has become more global and use of the spatial fix increases in 
order to overcome the crisis of falling profits (Harvey in Silver 2003: 41), 
transnational solidarity between ports across the globe becomes important for 
the movement and the level of associational bargaining power. 
Finally, solidarity can be seen as the fundamental component to 
associational bargaining power. Workers in general do not have the same 
access to capital and such resources, which is why they sell their labour power 
(Marx 1999). On the other hand, the withdrawal, or the potentiality of it, is 
their greatest source of power. As explained previously, the ability to do so 
depends on structural bargaining power and the collective organisation. For a 
collective organisation to be successful a sense of being part of a group is 
essential.  
Silver sees the link between the institutional collective body of workers and 
the bonds that are created by solidarity: 
 
Associational bargaining power is defined as the power that comes from the 
collective organization of workers, which in turn, is shaped by the location of 
workers within such non-workplace networks as those of kinship, neighborhood 
and community (Silver 2004). 
 
From this quote it is evident that there is a link between solidarity and the 
institutionalised organisation of workers. Whereas the types of network 
mentioned above specifically proclaims the importance of non-workplace 
networks this chapter will mainly deal with solidarity amongst workers – at 
the workplace and overseas. That is not to denounce the importance of the 
non-workplace network; rather the emphasis is on solidarity amongst workers 
because of our interest in the transnational aspects of dockworkers and to 
some extent seafarers. 
Solidarity is a social construct. It is a relational concept that involves more 
than one subject (a group or individual). It is constituted as an inter-
subjective interaction. A solidarity action is a message of support from one 
individual or group to another. This action can be based on certain values 
and/or material conditions.  
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From a materialist position, such as an orthodox Marxist one, identity is 
formed by your relation to the means of production or purely a matter of the 
distribution of material wealth as Bourdieu suggests (Hopf 2002: 2). 
Postmodernist perceptions refute this and emphasise the way subjects 
interpret (consciously or not) their situation. Between those two idealised 
opposing positions are the constructivists, who uphold an inter-subjective 
ontology, where reality and identity is shaped by the reciprocal relationship of 
the socially sanctioned me and the individual response, the I (Mead 1934). 
The me is how the individual subject is perceived by the group, the society i.e. 
the attitudes of the surroundings. The I is the individual self-understanding. 
The one category (although the distinction is blurred) influences the other and 
is at the same time constituted by the other. Solidarity on a group basis can be 
understood in a similar way: I feel/express solidarity towards the group, 
because I see myself as a part of the group. At the same time, I identify myself 
with the group, because the group see me as one that expresses my solidarity 
with them. Here it is evident that solidarity is different from, say relief aid, 
which does not have this element of reciprocity. In short, a broad definition of 
solidarity is when one subject supports another subject on the basis of shared 
conditions and/or values. 
Furthermore, solidarity has to be expressed either through actions or 
words. The element of action is there because solidarity has to be overt in 
order for it to be ‘real’ solidarity, because in doing so a mutual understanding 
of being on the ‘same side’ of the struggle is created and a common identity is 
created. To Hardt and Negri (2004: 104) class is created by the lines of 
struggle. This means that solidarity amongst the struggling defines who is in 
the group and who is outside; by doing so the potential political subject is 
created. But the action is not enough; it has to be bound by the shared values. 
These shared values are what many Marxists call class-consciousness. To 
illustrate this point one can look to the struggle of aboriginals. Lilla Watson, 
an aboriginal activist, said to Europeans that had come to aid her: “If you 
have come to help me, you are wasting your time. If you have come because 
your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together” (Watson in 
Lilla: International Women’s Network 2013). 
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By this statement it is clear that solidarity constitutes a political subject 
when there are shared values. The action has to somewhat reflect a shared 
condition, which gives reason to a common cause. Through the action of 
solidarity that cause is being confirmed by reassuring that both the receiving 
and the providing side of the solidarity action is on the same side of the 
struggle. 
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3. Methodology 
When studying a certain subject one cannot avoid walking into barriers that 
limit the analysis. Our analysis of dockworkers’ bargaining power has not 
been an exception, and therefore this methodological chapter will outline the 
empirical, theoretical, and analytical considerations of our paper. The chapter 
will thus be divided into three subchapters: one on empirical considerations, 
one on theoretical considerations, and one on analytical considerations. 
 
3.1. Empirical considerations 
This subchapter will consider and discuss the pitfalls and limitations that our 
choice of empirical data has brought with it. The subchapter will be divided 
into sections based on the empirical data used. Thus, the four sections will 
consider the case studies of the ports of the American West Coast and Hong 
Kong, the case study of ITF, the interviews conducted, and the choice of using 
dockworkers. 
 
3.1.1. The ports of the American West Coast and Hong Kong 
This section will consider the choice of the ports of the American West Coast 
and Hong Kong as cases together with the consequences of this choice for the 
analysis on structural bargaining power. 
 
Early in our analysis of dockworkers’ bargaining power it became apparent 
that we would not be able to dig into the trends of global trade and maritime 
shipping, if we would only conduct our analysis from a global perspective, 
simply as there does not exist global data on the field (see for instance Broeze 
2002: 237). Consequently, we chose to describe the global trends and assess 
their regional consequences for dockworkers and hereafter analyse the cases 
of the ports of the American West Coast and Hong Kong in order to dig deeper 
into the consequences of the trends for dockworkers. 
As the one part of the analysis considering structural bargaining power 
seeks to assess the importance of dockworkers to the economic system of 
global trade, it was necessary to use the cases of global container ports, as 
these serve as important gateways to the different regions of the world. If 
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dockworkers in the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB) stop working, 
the consequences are far greater than if dockworkers in the Port of San Diego 
stop working. Therefore, the choice of cases fell on the two biggest ports of the 
US, Los Angeles and Long Beach (which we have chosen to consider as one 
port complex – will be explained in the analysis) on the one side and the 
fourth biggest port of the world, until 2005 the biggest, Hong Kong. As data 
on the ports of LA/LB is limited, we chose to widen this case to all container 
ports of the American West Coast with a special focus on the ports of LA/LB. 
Our choice of cases was further based on geographical considerations. The 
leading global ports have within the last couple of decades shifted from the 
West to the East, with 9 out of the top 10 ports in the world being located in 
Asia. However, we wished to cover dockworkers in the West as well as the 
East, to which reason we chose an American and an Asian port. The particular 
choice of the ports of LA/LB and Hong Kong was based on their very recent 
strikes, which we chose to use as extensions to the case studies of the two 
ports. 
It is important to note that the two cases will not work as a comparative 
case study, since the employment data between the two ports differ 
significantly, as will be apparent in the analysis. As the very different 
employment figures indicate that the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) 
(comprising the American West Coast employment data) and the OECD 
(comprising the Hong Kong data) use very different methods, we simply 
cannot be certain that the two ports are comparable. 
Concerning the case of the American West Coast and the ports of LA/LB, 
we do not see it as a great problem that we focus on an entire region and on a 
port complex rather than on one port, as we do in the case of Hong Kong. As 
we do not compare the ports of the American West Coast with the Port of 
Hong Kong, it does not pose a great methodological problem that one case 
consists of several ports and the other only consists of one port. Rather, we see 
it as an extension of our empirical material that one case consists of data from 
a whole region. 
Concerning the case of the Port of Hong Kong it is important to note, as is 
further elaborated in the analysis, that Hong Kong is a special administrative 
region (SAR) of China and thus does not fall totally under Chinese law. This is 
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an important reason to why the strike of 2013 had strong trade union backing, 
but this also showcases that Hong Kong is a special case in Asia and thus 
cannot be generalised to the rest of Asia. 
As a concluding remark, it should be noted that neither of our cases are 
used in order to be able to generalise on the trends found in the two cases. 
Rather, the two case studies will work as examples of the general trends that 
we find in the forthcoming analytical section of global impacts on 
dockworkers’ bargaining power. 
 
3.1.2. Dockworkers as subject of analysis 
This section will consider why we chose dockers as our subject of analysis and 
what implications that choice has. 
 
From the very beginning we had a particular interest in the position in the 
global production chains that dockworkers have. We knew that most trade 
was conducted via sea and most of that was on line, i.e. container, ships. These 
ships need to be loaded and unloaded, putting the workers doing these tasks 
in a key position. 
When researching further on the topic, and especially when conducting the 
interviews, it became clear to us that seafarers play a significant role in 
relation to dockworkers, and of course they carry out the actual trade. For this 
reason seafarers have been included in the section on solidarity between 
seafarers and dockworkers under the analysis of associational bargaining 
power. If we had chosen seafarers and analysed their bargaining power, our 
analysis would have focused much more on the flags of convenience (FOC) 
campaign and the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) that ITF seafarers 
section is involved with. Seafarers are also more geographically disconnected, 
which makes the labour force in itself more international (Barcelona 2014). 
Both seafarers and dockers are in a bottleneck node in the value chains, 
which makes both trades relevant for analysing the link between global trade 
and labour’s bargaining power. However, the paper could not deal with both 
effectively and a choice had to be made, hence just a brief reference to the 
seafarers. The choice of dockworkers allows the paper to assess their 
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occupational culture and bonds of solidarity. Dockworkers have historically 
speaking been well unionised (Pigenet 2012: 143). 
 
3.1.3. International Transport Workers’ Federation 
This section will consider the choice of ITF as a case and its consequence for 
the analysis on associational bargaining power. 
 
We chose ITF as our case first and foremost because we wanted a global 
perspective on the dockworkers’ ability to organise, and ITF represents 
precisely the dockworkers globally. Further, ITF is one of the longest standing 
GUFs (Platzer 2011: 199), and because they represent several border-crossing, 
i.e. global, trades (aviation, rail, maritime transport etc.) transnational ways of 
organising are essential to them. This can be seen in their emphasis on 
international solidarity and their direct involvement with transnational 
corporations (TNCs) through the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) and 
the fact that they are the only GUF that have collective bargaining agreements 
(CBAs) (Barcelona 2014). For these reasons, ITF is one of the most well 
researched GUFs (Platzer 2011: 200). 
Nonetheless, we could have based our analysis on interviews with other 
actors or institutions. For example we could have interviewed the more left-
leaning, radical rival, International Dockworkers Council (IDC). This would 
have provided us with a more critical approach to the international system (in 
terms of trade as well as governance) and the contradictions between capital 
and labour would have been more outspoken. On the other hand, IDC is 
mainly based in Europe and only organises dockworkers, hence we would not 
have been able to get the same perspectives on the seafarers. In addition, the 
FOC campaign and the IBF and CBAs are initiated by and only dealt with by 
ITF, respectively. 
We could also have interview a national trade union or the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF). By dealing with a national union as our 
case, we would have been one organisation level closer to the workers, but this 
would have diminished the global perspective that we have been seeking. The 
same goes for ETF, which is a regional section of ITF. 
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Further, we interviewed the seafarers section. We wanted to apply Silver’s 
concept of associational bargaining power, which concerns the collective body 
of the workers, i.e. the trade union. The seafarers and dockworkers are 
separate sections in the same international trade union federation, ITF. It 
made sense to evaluate more than just one section of the union, because a 
main source of associational bargaining power lies in the strength of the union 
itself. Moreover, another source of associational bargaining power derives 
from bonds of solidarity, which is important amongst dockers as well as 
between dockers and seafarers. 
As it will be considered, the employers’ associational bargaining power is in 
a dialectic relationship with that of the dockworkers, thus it would have made 
sense to include them as part of the empirical data. Yet, there were limits to 
how much could be included in the project and our focus was on labour. At the 
same time the strategies of the companies are implicit in some of the 
tendencies presented below, thus we are not left with a complete blind spot in 
our analysis. As the section on critique of Silver will present, it is not always 
possible to determine how much of the action of the employers is to deal with 
the problem of labour (Silver 2003: 41) and how much is purely a response to 
changes in the market. 
Finally, we could have interviewed more ‘objective’ actors, i.e. an academic, 
in order to overcome the bias that the unions naturally have. This bias is dealt 
with by including academic articles. 
 
3.1.3.  The interviews 
Here we will consider the limitations for the interviews and what insights they 
have given us. 
 
The interviews were conducted over two days. First we interviewed Paula 
Hamilton, assistant secretary of the dockers section. The day after, we 
interviewed Fabrizio Barcelona, assistant secretary of the seafarers section – 
an interview that focused more on the specifics of the seafarers such as the 
FOC campaign and the CBAs. These issues were raised with Paula, but not 
discussed to length. In this sense, the first interview allowed us to go deeper 
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into certain topics – such as the flags of convenience (FOC) campaign and the 
CBAs – in the second interview. 
The interviews provided us with global perspectives on the issue of labour 
and trade seen from a union’s perspective, and with a qualitative 
understanding of how solidarity could be understood amongst maritime 
workers. They gave some analytical insights on how the unions see the global 
trends, and what strategy they subsequently follow. Also, there were things 
said in between the lines that could only be captured because we were sitting 
in the same room. For example Paula hesitated when explaining the solidarity 
bonds amongst dockers’ unions: 
 
I would say, there are distinctive elements to the type of solidarity dockers’ unions 
provide, but I am not going to talk on tape about it. Because I can't. But there is... 
There is a very... You know, if a docker dies on a terminal, if that is communicated 
amongst our affiliates, everyone feels it (Hamilton 2014) 
 
Her caution can be grounded in the fact that some of the “distinctive 
elements” may include illegal activity or activity that will weaken ITF’s 
negotiation position. Or it might allude to an internal culture with taboos and 
a certain code of behaviour as Pigenet describes: 
 
In what is an overridingly male code of behaviour, virility is considered a major 
attribute of identity, rooted in a scrupulous code of honour and expressed in 
everyday interaction in a thousand different ways by the exchange of exaggerated 
handshakes, slaps on the back, thumps, even the playful semblance of delivering 
blows (Pigenet 2002: 151-152). 
 
Paula also displayed her opinion on the level of trade unionism in Taiwan. She 
hesitated and watched her words when talking about their relationship with 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions with whom ITF is negotiating a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). With regard to Taiwan she said (and 
did not say): “Taiwan, *sigh* could be better *laughing*” (Hamilton 2014). 
There are limitations in doing such interviews. First of all, there is a 
positive bias towards labour. Secondly, the employees of ITF, which we have 
interviewed, cannot speak as freely as the politically elected. The politically 
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elected might also have greater or different insights. Thirdly, the issues we 
deal with are multifaceted and complex; henceforth an hour-long interview 
with several topics might be a bit superficial. Still, the interviews provided us 
with insights and overview of a complex area of the global labour market. 
 
3.2. Theoretical considerations 
This methodological subchapter will consider the two main theories used in 
this paper and discuss their relevance to the analysis. Thus, the former section 
will consider the theory of bargaining power, while the latter will consider the 
theory of global value chain analysis. 
 
3.2.1. Bargaining power 
This section will consider the theory of bargaining power, presented by 
Beverly J. Silver, and what the choice of the theory has meant for our analysis. 
The section will be based on critique from other scholars and schools. 
 
Silver comes from an unorthodox Marxist perspective, thus draws on the 
underlying assumptions of Marxism. These include the view that there is a 
dialectic relationship between labour and capital, which is expressed in their 
different positions in the production (not production chain). By this is meant 
that there are social relations that allocate power and possibilities for action. 
Here, Silver draws on World System Theory (WST) by Wallerstein and World 
Society by Meyer and sees the behaviour of the actor as more or less 
determined by the location within the system. The units in Silver’s system 
consist of the state, capital and labour (Silver 2003: 29). 
It is these assumptions that the harshest critique of Silver can be deployed 
upon. One objection to Silver’s framework could be that there is too much 
emphasis on structure leaving very little actual agency to the different actors. 
Silver accounts for that by introducing the concept of associational bargaining 
power. Another objection is that the theory is reductionist. An objection Silver 
herself admits is the case. She argues it is done in order to be able to do 
research at all (Silver 2003:28-29). Two other criticisms of Silver’s framework 
directly attack her core assumptions: that labour and capital are in conflict 
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and that it is this conflict, which is driving the actors’ behaviour. Both of them 
valid objections, but also a matter of theoretical preference. 
One limitation of the choice, Silver makes, is that the role of labour/capital 
might be overemphasised. It might be other factors that in fact are driving the 
event. Another limitation occurs when the interest of labour and capital 
overlaps, which sometimes appears in the end of a product cycle, where jobs 
are about to shift from one location to another. Some will argue that the 
companies and workers in the area that are losing jobs might have a common 
interest in keeping the job there. Silver and others will argue that while that 
might be true it is only a temporary and a space-specific convergence of 
interest. Despite these objections we find that the framework is highly useful, 
especially considered that we use the concept and apply it where we find it is 
suitable, which depends on the empirical data it is applied to. 
 
3.2.2. Global value chain analysis 
This section will consider the choice of global value chain (GVC) analysis and 
its consequence for the analysis. It will do so especially by locating it in 
relation to similar theoretical frameworks and taking up some of the critique 
brought from the schools preferring the alternatives. 
 
It is worth locating the GVC framework in relation to other frameworks that 
inspire/are inspired by GVC. A theoretical location of GVC aids an 
understanding of its analytical strengths and weaknesses. Further, there are 
some general problematic aspects of both GCCs/GVCs and global production 
networks (GPNs). With regard to this paper the main issue is with the agency 
given to labour. Some of the critique presented below, of the lack of labour 
agency, will come from GPN theorists, which is yet another reason for 
clarifying differences and similarities between the different frameworks. 
GCC, GVC, and GPN can all be viewed as part of the same tradition 
attempting to make sense of the changes in the way global commodities are 
being produced in the era of globalisation. The frameworks have borrowed 
concepts and ideas from each other. Therefore this paper will only engage 
with the debate briefly. For this purpose the main concern is to show a general 
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neglect of the role of labour and agency subscribed to it. First, a brief 
presentation of the evolution of the frameworks. 
GCC derives from the structural approach of WST. Its primary concern is to 
understand how global industries are organized. It consists of identifying the 
full set of actors (i.e. firms) that are involved in the production and 
distribution of a particular good or service and mapping the kinds of 
relationships that exist among them (Bair 2005: 157 quoted in Coe et al 
2008A: 267). Thus GCC focuses on a particular product (i.e. commodity) and 
has firms as the main actor. 
GVC has, as described above, similar traits as GCC. In addition to the firms 
and their interrelational power positions, GVC seeks to analyse the 
governmental environment in which the firms operate. The different types 
and aspects of such governance have been dealt with above. 
By some it has been argued that GPN is a more encompassing term than 
GVC. According to Cumbers et al. (2008: 371) GPN better captures the 
complex spatiality of power relation between diverse actors that shape the 
global production. The GCC framework as described by Gereffi, of whom GVC 
derives from, tend to emphasise the power of a lead firm and from that 
describing the rest of the chain. GPN better captures the more fluid networks 
of power together with the geographical embeddedness of GPNs and the 
strategic coupling of firms and regions. The latter point is related to the ideas 
of clustering. Coe et al. also argue that a GVC is too linear and the production 
network approach better captures exactly the fluidness and complexity of the 
flows. In addition, they argue that where GVC understands governance 
narrowly as inter-firm interaction, GPN seeks to uncover “all relevant sets of 
actors and relationships” (2008B: 272). The figure below illustrates the 
different aspects that GPN tries to incorporate into its analysis. It only takes a 
brief glance at the figure to realise that a GPN is indeed encompassing many 
aspects. It seems as if the framework seeks to capture almost everything, thus 
becoming unfocused and a bit of a ‘laundry list’, which is precisely what it has 
been criticised for. 
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Figure 1 (Coe et al. 2008B: 273) 
 
Regardless the debate and the critique between the frameworks, it seems that 
there is convergence between the GCC/GVC and GPN frameworks. The 
outcomes, when it comes to the actual analysis, do not differ greatly. As Levy 
puts it: 
 
despite its ‘lofty ambitions’, most of the studies spawned by the GPN framework 
to date are, in practice, very similar to those generated using GCC analysis [...] the 
GCC/GPN framework appears to be converging with more conventional 
approaches to competitiveness and losing touch with its more critical origins 
(Levy 2008, quoted in Coe et al. 2008B: 274). 
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We have chosen to focus on the GVC framework, since it offers some clear and 
readily applicable concepts on how chains are structured and governed. 
Despite the debate amongst the frameworks, there is an underestimation of 
the role of labour. According to Cumbers et al. (2008), both GPN and 
GCC/GVC literature focus very much on issues of economic governance in 
sustaining accumulation. However, there is little said about the social 
relations of production (Smith et al. 2002 quoted in Cumbers et al. 2008), 
other than to assume the hegemony of capital. “Labour, other than as an 
occasional short term impediment, is no longer a problem for capital” 
(Cumbers et al. 2008: 371). When this project uses GVC it is not to neglect the 
agency labour has. Rather, we would advocate an analysis that uses some of 
the key concepts of GVC as analytical underpinnings such as the idea of global 
production organised in chains with certain governance structures depending 
on the firms’ structure. 
As outlined in the theoretical subchapter on labour agency in global value 
chains, GVC analysis is not a perfect fit with our analysis, as it is commonly 
used to analyse products going through GVCs. However, we have chosen to 
use GVC analysis as a framework in our analysis to supplement the analytical 
tools of structural bargaining power. The concepts of GVC and the placement 
of dockworkers as a node within GVCs serve the analysis of dockworkers’ 
structural bargaining power with an illumination of the importance of 
dockworkers within the economic system. It is to this reason that we have 
chosen to use GVC analysis as a framework in our paper. 
 
3.3. Analytical considerations 
In this subchapter we will consider the methodological choices we have taken 
in the analysis. 
 
3.3.1. Historical focus 
We have chosen to have quite a big historical focus both as a forerunner to our 
analysis and within our analysis. In this section we will explain why we have 
chosen to have such a great focus on historical trends within maritime 
shipping. 
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Globalisation is not a new development that has come with the computer 
technology, but a concept that has existed and grown in significance ever since 
the dawn of world trade, dating several centuries back. Therefore, it has to be 
understood in the light of its own history (Schwartz 2010). The same goes for 
global maritime trade, which, as will be explained in the chapter of historical 
outline, has existed for several centuries. 
In order to understand the present state of global maritime trade, we see it 
as a necessity to place it within its own history. Thus, the chapter of historical 
outline will sketch the historical developments within global trade and 
maritime shipping with a special focus on the concept of containerisation that, 
from the end of the 1950s, began altering maritime shipping as well as global 
trade extensively. We will use this historical overview to bring the concept of 
containerisation, and what other trends it has brought with it, with us to the 
analysis, where we will assess the consequences of the trends on dockworkers’ 
structural bargaining power. 
The chapter of historical outline will furthermore delineate the historical 
developments of the organisation of dockworkers with a special focus on ITF, 
as the long history of dockworkers’ organisation is quite unique, to which 
reason the history is important to our analysis. The history of dockworkers’ 
organisation will thus be brought with us to the analysis of dockworkers’ 
associational bargaining power. 
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4. Historical outline 
 
4.1. Maritime trade 
This subchapter will describe the historical developments within maritime 
trade with a special focus on the concept of containerisation, which, as we 
shall see, has had great impact on maritime trade and on the global economy 
as a whole. 
 
4.1.1. From Ancient Egypt to containerisation 
The transportation of goods at sea dates back to the ancient civilisations of, 
among others, Egypt, Rome, China, and the Philippines, several decades 
before Christ. During the Middle Ages regional sea shipping between Europe, 
the Middle East, Asia, and West Africa grew steadily and began blooming at 
the very beginning of the 17th century with the founding of the first large, 
private shipping companies, British East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch 
ditto (VOC, Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) (van Ham & Rijsenbrij 
2012: 1-2). 
EIC and VOC together controlled the vast majority of global sea shipping up 
until the 19th century, variously as allies and enemies. During the 17th century 
Dutch VOC was by far the leader in sea shipping, but British EIC overtook this 
position during the 1700s and maintained its leadership position until its 
dissolution towards the end of the 19th century (Schwartz 2010: 37-41). Note 
how well the timing of the combat between the two shipping companies 
reflects that of the hegemonic combat between the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (Flint & Taylor 2007: 49). 
Steam turbines and diesel engines together with the building of the Suez 
and Panama Canals meant shorter and easier travelling, thus steadily 
increasing the intercontinental trade during the 20th century. When the 
gunpowder of the two world wars abated, the cargo ships had evolved into 
mastodons carrying up to 14,000 deadweight tonnage (dwt)1 at a speed of up 
to 21 knots. The ports, however, could not keep up with the pace, which meant 
                                                   
1 The sum of the weights of everything on board that the ship can safely carry (Turpin & 
McEwen 1980: 14-21). 
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that ships often had to wait several days in the terminals due to the labour-
intensive processes of loading and unloading. As a necessary result came 
containerisation that (once again) revolutionised maritime shipping (van 
Ham & Rijsenbrij 2012: 2-3). 
 
4.1.2. Containerisation and its impact on maritime shipping 
In 2007 Wal-Mart alone had no less than 720,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit 
(TEU) containers shipped to American ports (Eckes 2011: 230). 50 years 
earlier, on the 26th of April 1956, Ideal X sailed from Port Newark, New Jersey 
with 58 33-ft containers on board. Five days later, when Ideal X docked in 
Houston, Texas, it had started the global journey of containerisation (Ham & 
Rosenbrij 2012: 17; Nash 2012: 39). The fact that a steel box can give name to 
a whole era gives a good indication of how big an impact the container has had 
on world trade. 
The idea by Malcom McLean, the brain and businessman behind Ideal X, 
was to fill more containers onto one vessel and to let the vessel dock and leave 
the harbours within the same day. He did this by developing a standardised 
container that only had to be opened twice, once when loaded at the beginning 
of the shipping and once when unloaded at the final destination (Joyce 2012: 
39). Up until now, goods carried on sea would be packed in boxes, bags, crates 
etc. in all kinds of shapes and sizes, which meant that they had to be sorted 
and stowed individually, most often by forklift, at every successive stage 
during the shipping. This meant lots of manpower and lots of time at every 
transition of the goods, making transportation by sea a troublesome way of 
freighting goods (Broeze 2002: 9). However, McLean saw the possibilities in 
the sea, for here was a surface that did not have to be paved before you could 
travel upon it (Scientific American 2007). 
Although containers were not an entirely new concept when they were 
loaded onto Ideal X in 1956, the idea of removing them entirely from the 
trucks before loading them onto the ships was new. Before, the trailers from 
the trucks, including the entire running gear, were driven onto the ships, 
occupying a lot of space, as they could not be stacked (van Ham & Rijsenbrij 
2012: 13). With McLean’s standardisation, the containers could now be lifted 
from the trucks by cranes onto the vessel and, in the next port, from the vessel 
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onto new trucks – without having to be repacked once. As a result, McLean 
was changing the moving of general cargo from a predominantly labour-
intensive process to a far more capital-intensive process (Nash 2012: 39). 
However, the progress took time. By 1960 the liner ships still spent less 
than half their time at sea (Broeze 2002: 9-10), but by 1970 containerisation 
had become a transatlantic and transpacific concept, not least thanks to the 
standardisation of container sizes that the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) made in 1961. Today, the two most commonly used 
container sizes are the de jure standard TEU and the double-sized, most 
common, forty-foot equivalent unit (FEU) (worldshipping.org 2014C). 
By 1970 the main ports in the economic triad (the US, Western Europe, and 
Japan) predominated the global throughputs of containers, but after 1970 
their share started falling as global sea trade expanded. By the late 1970s the 
diffusion accelerated and spread beyond the triad to Latin America, the 
Mediterranean, and Asian tigers Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Guerrero 
& Rodrigue 2014: 158-159). In the ten-year period from 1970 to 1980 the total 
amount of cargo shipped by sea rose by more than 40 percent, from 2,605 to 
3,704 million tons (UNCTAD 2013: 7). 
The second oil crisis of 1979/1980 temporarily slowed down the rapid 
evolution of maritime shipping due to less growth within the international 
trade and rising fuel prices causing significant cost increases in the shipping 
industry (van Ham & Rijsenbrij 2012: 87), so by 1990 seaborne trade had 
risen by less than 10 percent in weight of cargo, to 4.008 million tons of cargo 
being shipped (UNCTAD 2013: 7). 
Up through the 1990s the pace was taken up again, and from the middle of 
the century the container was the de facto standard in global shipping of 
cargo. This development was especially helped along by the many emerging 
Chinese ports (Guerrero & Rodrigue 2014: 159), and the high growth rates in 
international trade furthermore meant restructurings and new types of 
collaborations within maritime trade. In 1996 the French shipping company 
Compagnie Général Maritime (CGM) was privatised and sold to Compagnie 
Maritime a’Affrétement (CMA), merging the two companies to one, CMA 
CGM, soon to become one of the world’s leading shipping companies. More 
alliances and acquisitions followed, and in 1999 Maersk bought the majority 
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of Sea-Land, the shipping company founded by Malcom McLean four years 
after his journey with Ideal X. Maersk’s additional acquisition of the South 
Africa rooted Safmarine Container Lines (SCL) is moreover a good illustration 
of the growing North-South trade that took place in the late 1990s. The 
growing companies meant growing ships as well, and the ports were once 
again on the back foot, illustrated when the new Regina Maersk ship as a 
signal to port officials and politicians entered the New York-New Jersey 
Harbor at high tide, only 20 percent loaded, and without its communications 
mast in order to stay clear of both sea bottom and bridges. The New York-New 
Jersey Harbor was later modernised at a price of almost 1.5 billion USD (van 
Ham & Rijsenbrij 2012: 153, 155, 156, 159). At the dawn of the new 
millennium, in the year 2000, 5,984 million tons of cargo was shipped by sea 
– an increase of almost 50 percent compared to 1990 (UNCTAD 2013: 7). 
In 2005 7,109 million tons of cargo was shipped by sea – close to a 20 
percent increase compared to five years earlier (UNCTAD 2013: 7). 2005 was 
also the year when the vessel MSC Pamela broke the record with a capacity of 
no less than 9,200 TEU containers. The growing companies and vessels meant 
centralisation, so by November the top 20 shipping lines together owned more 
than 7 million TEU containers – around 59 percent of the global total. The top 
5 shipping lines, with Maersk as number 1, Mediterranean Shipping Company 
(MSC) number 2, and CMA CGM number 3, controlled more than half of 
these 59 percent (Ham & Rijsenbrij 2012: 161, 165). 
Although the global financial crisis is evident in the 2009 figures of the 
amount of sea borne cargo (only 7,858 million tons compared to 8,229 in 
2008), at least on the surface it left no more than bruises on the maritime 
shipping industry. In 2012 9,165 million tons of cargo was thus shipped by sea 
(UNCTAD 2013: 7). 
In 2013 the aforementioned top 3 shipping lines, Maersk, MSC, and CMA 
CGM, decided to unite under the P3 Alliance, thus controlling 255 vessels, 
more than 2.5 million TEU containers and approximate market shares of 42 
percent of the Asia-Europe route, up to 42 percent of the transatlantic, and 24 
percent of the transpacific route (Forbes 2013). Around the same time Maersk 
set new standards in the category of mega container ships with the 
introduction of the world’s biggest ship with a capacity of more than 18,000 
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TEU containers – around double of the 2005 record holder (Børsen 2013). In 
early 2014 the P3 Alliance was cleared by American maritime authority, the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), paving the way for the success of the 
alliance (Shippingwatch 2014). The P3 Alliance has raised fear of 
monopolistic tendencies within the shipping industry (Forbes 2013) – a 
tendency that also can have huge effect on dockworkers. 
Whereas the more recent developments and competition within the liner 
shipping industry have just been outlined here to sketch the features of the 
industry in order to have them in mind when going into the analysis, the great 
development of containerisation will be brought with us to the analysis, where 
it will be further elaborated and assessed, since it arguably has had great 
consequences for dockworkers. 
 
4.2. ITF as an organisation 
In order to make an analysis of the associational bargaining power, some data 
about ITF, our case study, must be laid out. This sub-chapter sets out to do so. 
It presents some membership figures and historical highlights of interest. 
 
ITF is one of the most long-standing sectorial unions, most well researched, 
and strongest, with 781 affiliates in 155 countries, representing 4.6 million 
workers in 2010. Initially they only represented dockers and seafarers, but 
nowadays they also represent railworkers, civil aviation, and minor sections 
such as fisheries and tourism. However, dockers and seafarers are still very 
significant for ITF, since they represent 600,000 of those, which is a uniquely 
high number for any GUF (Platzer 2011: 199). 
In 1896 British sailors and dockworkers set up the International Federation 
of Ship, Dock and River Workers, the forerunner of ITF. The union had a 
twofold purpose: first of all to overcome the fragmentation in the still new 
British labour movement in the maritime sector, and secondly, to organise 
dockworkers overseas. The origins and motivation for ITF was from the very 
beginning the need for international co-operation in order to counter the 
undermining of labour standards by ports abroad (Platzer 2011: 200). 
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It is not obvious that dockworkers should be one of the most well organized 
trades, due to its very casual hiring-and-firing practices, but history proved 
otherwise: 
 
Nothing predisposed the ports, where random hiring-and-firing practices reigned 
supreme and anyone could turn up in the hope of a few hours’ work, to become 
bastions of trade union strength able to perform the astonishing feat of forging a 
distinction between flexible work and casual labour (Pigenet 2012: 143). 
 
Maybe it was exactly due to the casual hiring practices that the urgency and 
necessity for a well-organised labour force made ITF so relatively successful. 
Just before the outbreak of World War 1 ITF had 52 affiliates in eight 
countries with an individual membership of 887,000, making ITF the second 
biggest GUF at the time, only exceeded by International Metalworkers’ 
Federation (Platzer 2011: 201), which rose to 2.4 million in 37 countries in 
1932 (Platzer 2011: 203). This shows the huge expansion in the industry and 
of the numbers of countries as well as workers involved in wage labour that is 
being covered by ITF. 
Below, figure 2 shows both the growth in members (of affiliates) and the 
regional distribution of ITF. The most significant shifts are the growth of 
African/Arab countries and Latin America, and the decline of Asia and Europe 
on the other hand. North America (mainly US) has grown a lot since 1946, but 
has halved from 1950 to 2006. What cannot be read from the figures is that 
most of the members come from the industrial countries: US 11.8 percent, 
Japan 9.5 percent, Germany 9 percent, and UK 5.9 percent. The same goes for 
the affiliates of which 71 percent are part of the OECD (Platzer 2012: 206). 
Interestingly enough the high point in membership was in 1959. Despite 
growth since 1970 ITF has not recovered from the huge drop from 1959 to 
1970. It was exactly in this period of time that the era of containerisation 
started eating big chunks off of dockworker employment, and that the ship 
owners started registering ships outside of the traditional, national ship 
registries, i.e. registering as an FOC ship. More on this later. 
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Figure 2 (Platzer 2012: 206) 
 
Figure 3 shows the membership per section. The rail section is still the 
biggest, but has more than halved since 1955. The growth has been in the 
seafarers and dockers section that, respectively, have more than and nearly 
doubled. The biggest shifts, however, is in civil aviation that has grown from 
only 1.2 percent to 14.3 percent of ITF in the 51 years the figure covers. Road 
transport is the second largest section despite a small drop (along with rail, 
seafarers and fishing) from 1993 to 2006. The changes in percentages of 
different sections are due to changes in the global logistics patterns. Both the 
changes in patterns, the overall drop (despite the regrowth in recent years), 
and diversity of sectors that are included in ITF, show how complex it is to 
govern and make policies that benefit all members. Therefore it is obvious 
that ITF cannot work in the interest of all transport workers equally at all 
times. 
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Figure 3 (Platzer 2012: 206) 
 
Today around 700 unions representing over 4.5 million transport workers 
from some 150 countries are members of the ITF (ITFGlobal.org 2014A). The 
dockers section alone has 221 affiliates that represent 350,000 port workers 
(ITFGlobal.org 2014B), while the seafarers section represents over 600,000 
workers through their affiliates (ITFGlobal.org 2014C). According to Fabrizio 
Barcelona ITF unionises “roughly half of the total workforce” of seafarers 
(Barcelona 2014). 
According to the Global Union Federations (2006) that has compared its 
GUF members, ITF is no longer the second largest in sheer numbers of 
affiliates or workers being represented, however that does not mean that their 
importance and significance has declined. As the analysis will uncover below, 
the FOC campaign, the level of international solidarity, and the fact that the 
ITF was the first GUF to get a CBA makes the dockworkers and seafarers 
section continually important sectors in making ITF a unique GUF. 
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5. Analysis 
The analysis will assess the bargaining power of dockworkers. Consequently, 
the analytical chapter will be divided into two subchapters, one on structural 
bargaining power and one on associational bargaining power. 
 
5.1. Dockworkers’ structural bargaining power  
This analytical subchapter will assess the structural bargaining power of 
dockworkers. The analysis will begin with an assessment of the great 
contemporary trends within global trade and maritime shipping in order to 
analyse their positive and negative implications on dockworkers’ structural 
(and associational where it overlaps) bargaining power. 
In order to be able to move into a deeper analysis of dockworkers’ 
structural bargaining power, the analysis will move on to a case study of two 
of the world’s biggest port regions: The ports of the American West Coast with 
a special focus on Los Angeles and Long Beach, in this paper considered as 
one entity (more on this later), and the Port of Hong Kong. As outlined in the 
methodology we have chosen these two ports as analytical cases due to their 
sizes, their great connectedness in terms of trade routes (Bonacich and Wilson 
2008: 62), and due to the strikes that hit them in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
These two strikes will be used as an extension to the case study, since they can 
illustrate the structural bargaining power of the dockworkers in a direct 
conflict. 
The analysis will thus begin with a broad outline placing dockworkers and 
their bargaining power within the contemporary trends of global trade and 
maritime shipping and build upon this outline with a more in-depth analysis 
of dockworkers’ bargaining power in the case studies of two of the world’s 
biggest ports. 
The sections of this subchapter will be Global impacts on dockworkers’ 
bargaining power, The ports of the American West Coast, The Port of Hong 
Kong, The 2012 Los Angeles/Long Beach strike, The 2013 Hong Kong strike, 
and lastly a sub-conclusion. 
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5.1.1. Global impacts on dockworkers’ bargaining power 
This section will outline the great trends within global trade and the shipping 
industry, focusing on the overall trends of containerisation and logistics 
revolution and the trends they have brought with them. The section will build 
upon earlier analyses within the academic field of global political economy in 
order to discuss the trends’ positive as well as negative impacts on 
dockworkers. The section will thus serve the analysis with a more general 
overview of the structural bargaining power of dockworkers as a consequence 
of the greatest developments within the shipping industry during the last 
decades. As all the trends mentioned in this section are indeed intertwined, we 
have not given each of them their own section, but merely marked the 
concepts in bold, when mentioned for the first time, marking that we shift the 
focus to this new concept. Before a brief summary, the section will assess the 
developments of dockworker earnings in the US as an example in order to give 
indications to how the global trends have affected the structural bargaining 
power of dockworkers. 
 
Containerisation is the biggest altering factor that the shipping industry 
has seen in modern times. As explained in the historical chapter the 
standardisation of the containers seriously decreased the time and price of 
moving goods around the world, and thus made extensive economies of scale 
possible for the liner shipping industry. 
One main reason to the success story of containerisation is the fact that it 
changed the loading and unloading of the vessels from a labour-intensive to a 
highly capital-intensive process. The cargo handled by one worker grew from 
between 1 to 4.5 tons per hour during the break-bulk system to around 30-50 
tons per hour when the containers were introduced. In the beginning of 
containerisation this meant a massive decrease in the employment of 
dockworkers – up to 60 percent in some countries (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 
177; Broeze 2002: 235). 
Containerisation is a long and still on-going process that has brought 
several other developments with it. Some of the most recent and most altering 
are increasing automation and intermodalism. Intermodalism – the ability 
to quickly move containers from one mode of transportation to another – 
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became possible with the standardisation of the container, as the goods no 
longer had to be repacked, but could merely be lifted off a vessel and onto a 
truck. Intermodalism is quite an important development within the shipping 
industry. It made the geographical location of ports less important, as the 
goods could now easily be moved by land to other destinations after the 
arrival in the port (as the case of Asian goods bound for the American East 
Coast explained in the forthcoming section on the ports of the American West 
Coast). With a weakened geographical parameter the gates to competition 
were opened (Peoples et al. 2006: 223), which especially within the latest 
decades has let the biggest ports outrun their smaller combatants 
(iaphworldports.org 2014). The heightened competition serves as an 
important underlying mechanism in this subchapter on structural bargaining 
power, as it has been the driver of many of the trends, since global ports have 
had to live up to the trends in order to stay competitive. 
Intermodalism has been an important part of what has been termed the 
logistics revolution. The logistics revolution refers to the trend of increased 
integration that has come with the increasing number of global value chains 
(GVCs), and thus the increasingly geographical dispersion of production. This 
geographical dispersion, together with the big number of firms operating in 
the GVCs, makes the production chains widely complex, necessitating a great 
amount of logistical planning involving computerised information and 
communications technology (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 14; van Ham & 
Rijsenbrij 2012: 111). Meanwhile, in order to constantly control the flow of 
goods, many big retail companies (Wal-Mart being the far most popular 
example in academic literature) have taken control over most of their GVCs in 
order to constantly be able to fit the supply of goods to the demand by their 
customers. These buyer-driven GVCs have called for even more logistical 
planning, as control over an entire supply chain further necessitates logistics 
analysts that can command the whole chain, together with reliable systems 
and agreements in every node of the chain (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 3-4). 
Together, these developments have led to what is today termed the logistics 
revolution. 
The logistics revolution has posed a big threat to dockworkers, as it, among 
other developments, has brought automation and subcontracting with it. By 
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subcontracting labour, the parent company, the big retailer controlling 
most of the GVC, can divide itself from its labour force. That way the parent 
company can control its employees without having to negotiate with them. If 
the contractor firm suddenly raises its fees as a result of increased wage 
demand by its workers, the parent company can quickly shift to another 
provider. This gives increased power to the parent company and decreased 
power to the workers (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 15-16). Silver (2003: 14) sees 
subcontracting as a consequence of the post-Fordist transformations of the 
organisation of production and labour, and as an undermining factor of 
labour’s workplace bargaining power. As will be showcased in the section on 
the 2013 Hong Kong strike, also dockworkers have been exposed to 
subcontracting. 
Automation has been a pivotal instrument in heightening the efficiency 
and level of planning in the container terminals. The dockworkers working 
directly with the loading and unloading of ships at the port have thus been 
threatened by the development of new machines that highly increase the 
efficiency in terms of container throughput. However, it is important to note 
that these machines still have to be operated by workers, which means that a 
smaller, but at the same time higher educated, labour force is needed at the 
ports (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 177). As will be showcased in the section of 
the 2012 Los Angeles/Long Beach strike, however, other types of 
dockworkers, not working directly with the loading and unloading at the ports 
but behind computer screens, have (at least their unions claim so) been 
exposed to the threat of outsourcing. This is due to the fact that their jobs do 
not have to be conducted at the port, and their employers can therefore 
outsource the jobs to locations where labour is cheaper. This is a direct 
consequence of automation, as computer technology has made it obsolete for 
a part of the port workforce to be apparent at the ports. 
Logistical planning and automation have prompted the possibility of 
controlling the goods all the way through the GVCs and increasing their speed 
on the way from the factory to the retailer. This has given birth to the concept 
of just-in-time (JIT) production, where storage and other time consumers 
are decreased or even totally removed along the chain in order to let the goods 
constantly flow through the chain. According to Silver (2003: 6) this has 
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actually turned out to be a strengthening factor for transport workers, as they 
have the extensive power of being able to obstruct this flow. According to 
calculations presented in a recent OECD (2013B: 18) report, each additional 
day of transportation decreases trade volumes by 1 percent, since some 
perishable goods and livestock simply go to waste, and increases the 
transportation rate of USD 56, which on average raises the price of 
manufactured goods 0.8 percent. Work stoppages and other industrial actions 
in ports have caused serious shipping delays (OECD 2013B: 58) (as will also 
be showcased in the two sections on strikes), and with JIT production these 
delays have become even more harmful. Consequently, Bonacich & Wilson 
(2008: 22) suggest that unions may have to develop JIT strategies in order to 
wield the threatening hand that JIT production has brought to the poker table.  
 
As explained in the methodological subchapter of empirical considerations, 
the lack of global data on employment is a big limitation to this project. 
Meanwhile, even overall wage statistics for Asian dockworkers have been 
impossible to locate. Thus the only information on Asian dockworker earnings 
we can present are in the section on the 2012 Hong Kong strike with 1) the 
Hong Kong docker that indicates that there has been real wage decreases prior 
to the strike, and 2) the 9.8 percent wage increase that was the settlement of 
the strike. Consequently, in this section we can only present data on wages for 
American dockers as an attempt to assess the consequences of the many 
trends within global trade and maritime shipping for the bargaining power of 
dockworkers. 
In relation to this, as wages between countries and regions differ 
considerably, also within the international trade of dockers, it is important to 
bear in mind that the wage stats of American dockworkers cannot be 
generalised, but merely serve as an example of how dockers in one, to global 
trade quite important, country have been affected. For instance, in the US two 
deregulating acts, the Shipping Act and the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, were 
implemented in the shipping industry in 1984 and 1998, respectively (Hall 
2008; Peoples et al. 2006). These deregulating acts have most likely meant 
that American shipping has experienced different implications than e.g. Dutch 
or Chinese shipping, which may have affected the wages of American dockers 
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differently than the wages of Dutch or Chinese dockers. However, as the US 
has historically been, and still is, a very important country within global trade, 
and as their ports still serve as pivotal gateways within global trade, we 
consider the wage figures of American dockworkers as good indications of 
how dockworkers in global ports have been affected by the trends within the 
last couple of decades. 
The wage figures of American dockworkers show both a real wage increase 
and a relative increase since 1984, when paralleled with comparative workers 
outside the transportation industry. Talley (2002) thus finds that the weekly 
wages of American dockworkers have increased more than 15 percent in the 
period after 1984. Hall (2009: 75-76) finds that dockworkers in the eleven 
biggest ports in the US2 earned over USD 20,500 more than comparable 
workers in the same cities in the period 1984-1998 and over USD 27,500 more 
in the successive period 1999-2005. Truckers and warehouse workers, on the 
other hand, saw declines relatively to the comparable workers outside the 
transportation sector. 
Hall (2009: 75-76) further finds that the wage increases of the dockworkers 
outside the big port cities have been significantly smaller between the 1984-
1998 to the 1999-2005 periods. A finding that indicates that the increased 
competition that has come together with the latest trends, as outlined above, 
mostly benefits the dockworkers in the ‘winning’ ports. 
The figures of the increasing dockworker earnings are a good indication of 
the strengthened position that the trends within maritime shipping have 
brought American dockworkers. However, the associational bargaining power 
as always plays a major role as well. Talley (2004: 222) concludes that the 
relative success of the American dockers, compared to their co-workers in the 
trucking and warehouse sectors, and to comparable workers outside the 
transportation sector, is directly linked to the fact that the aforementioned 
deregulation acts brought a shift in the balance of power from the 
management to the unions, while the opposite was the case for truckers and 
warehousers. This indicates that the American docker unions have played a 
great role in wielding the advantages and diminishing the disadvantages that 
                                                   
2 In 2005 figures: Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, Tacoma, New York-
New Jersey, Houston-Galveston, Miami, Hampton Roads/Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah 
(Hall 2009: 71). 
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the trends of global trade and maritime shipping have brought the 
dockworkers. An assumption, which we will investigate in the successive 
analytical subchapter on dockworkers’ associational bargaining power. 
 
As this section has illustrated the trends of global trade and maritime shipping 
have had conflicting consequences for the dockworkers’ bargaining power. 
These conflicting trends may be due to complexity of the trends and the 
geographical differences among dockworkers. Thus, the next analytical 
sections will consist of two case studies in order to make a more detailed 
analysis of dockworkers’ structural bargaining power. Furthermore, many of 
the figures from this section are concerning ports in the US. With the Port of 
Hong Kong being one of the two case studies, we hope to be able to cover the 
structural bargaining power of dockworkers in the East more. 
 
5.1.2. The ports of the American West Coast 
This section will provide a brief outline of the history and the recent figures of 
the ports of the American West Coast with a focus on the ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach. The section will thus situate the port region within the 
history of global trade and containerisation and visualise its figures and trends 
as a global port region. 
Before beginning the analysis, a brief explanation of why the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach in this paper are considered as one port, is needed. 
Whereas the Port of Hong Kong is a single harbour, the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach are two autonomous container ports, but the fact that they 
are situated so close to each other (that it is difficult to tell where one stops 
and the other begins) has meant a relatively high degree of cooperation 
between the two (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 45), which again has resulted in 
the fact that the two ports are often considered as one in the media and 
academic literature. The fact that the strike of 2012, which will be dealt with in 
this analysis, was a combined strike between the workers of the two ports 
further makes it relevant to combine the two ports in this analysis. It should 
further be noted that when the two ports’ yearly TEU throughput is put 
together, they, in 2012 figures, jump from a 16th and a 23rd place, respectively, 
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on the global top 50 of container ports to a 9th place, overtaking Rotterdam as 
the biggest container port in the West (worldshipping.org 2014B). 
 
The Port of New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) has been the natural leading port 
for most of American history, but in 1986 the ports of LA/LB (Bonacich & 
Wilson 2008: 58) overtook this position. Today, both of the ports even 
surpass NY/NJ when not combined, in terms of TEU throughput 
(worldshipping.org 2014A). 
The cause to the rise of LA/LB is to be found in the rising shipping traffic 
on the American West Coast generally. From 1970 to 1980 the weight of cargo 
handled by the West Coast ports thus almost quadrupled, from 8.8 million 
tons to 35 million tons. In 1990 the figure had grown to more than 90 million 
tons, and in 2000 it had grown further to 174 million tons. Only six years later 
the cargo handled had risen to 362 million tons. The role of containerisation 
in this equation is clearly visualised, when noting that containers accounted 
for 14.6 percent of the total weight in 1970 and 72 percent in 2006 (Bonacich 
& Wilson 2008: 58; PMA 2014: 1). 
The West Coast ports experienced their highest peak in 2007 with 
approximately 370 million tons of cargo throughput. This fell as the financial 
crisis hit in 2008, and in 2009 the figures took a thrilling dip to less than 300 
million tons. In 2013 the figures had recovered at 340 million tons (PMA 
2014: 1). 
The rise of the American West Coast is not least due to the shift that 
happened in the late 1970s: Asia overtook Europe’s former position as main 
trader with the US, and that position has only been strengthened since 
(Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 59). However, the newfound natural growth of the 
West Coast has not benefited all the ports equally; the ports of LA/LB 
continue to consolidate their position as the leading West Coast (and 
American) ports. During the strike in 2012, several newspaper articles 
presented data saying that no less than 40 percent of American imports came 
through the ports of LA/LB (NYTimes 2012; Press-Telegram 2012; Daily 
Breeze 2012). But let us take a closer look to why exactly these two ports have 
experienced the highest growth in the region. 
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The first factor that plays a role is the size of the local and regional market. 
The big population of Southern California and its high production means that 
a big portion of the goods that go through the ports of LA/LB stay in the 
region (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 60-61). 
The second important factor is that of geography. As China has outgrown 
Japan in importance, the shipping routes have moved south, which has 
benefited the region of Southern California, where the ports of LA/LB are 
situated (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 61-62). If you look at a map, it is no puzzle 
that the rise of the ports of Shanghai and especially southbound Hong Kong 
has benefited LA/LB. 
The third factor concerns that of infrastructure. As the container vessels 
continue to grow in size, as explained in the historical chapter, the ports need 
to keep up with both deep-water channels and land infrastructure providing 
access to the mainland. LA/LB have, with help from the State of California, 
been ahead in this development, and that has made them the preferred ports 
of the majority of vessels (Bonacich & Wilson 2008: 62-63). 
The last factor is that of logistics. The key position of the ports of LA/LB 
plays a huge role in this, as many corporations have set up their regional 
distribution centres in Southern California, often to have direct access to the 
ports. Several other companies living directly off the ports, by providing them 
and their users services, have set up business close to the ports, just like 
massive warehouses are located close to the ports. Further, the ports of LA/LB 
excel in the concept of intermodalism, presented in the above section. This 
development has played a great role, since it has meant that Asian cargo 
bound for the American East Coast can now arrive at the West Coast by ship, 
where it is transloaded (shifted from one mode of transport to another) onto 
trains that can carry it across the American mainland to the East Coast. By the 
late 1980s the majority of East Coast-bound Asian cargo would travel this 
way, and transloading still plays a huge role in the attractiveness of LA/LB, 
especially as it seems to become even more important in the future (Bonacich 
& Wilson 2008: 63-64; Peoples et al. 2006: 222-223). 
These advantages of the ports of LA/LB can be some of the explanation to 
why Hall, presented in the above section, found that dockworker wages in the 
big port cities were considerably higher than outside of the big port cities. 
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With that in mind, let us take a closer look at the employment of the LA/LB 
ports. 
 
Especially the role of logistics and the following trend of automation have 
been named a critical threat to dockworkers in recent times, as they ‘steal’ 
their jobs. However, if we take a look upon the employment figures of all the 
West Coast ports from 1993, it does not seem that these labour threats have 
been big enough to bruise the dockworkers. From 1993 to 2006 the number of 
employees in West Coast ports grew from just above 8,000 to almost 15,000 
(PMA 2014: 1). 
The significant labour growth is directly connected to the rising number of 
containers going through the West Coast ports. However, if we divide the 
number of containers with the number of workers to get the number of 
containers per worker, we actually see a fall in employment. In 1998 (the first 
year of container figures in the PMA report) more than 11 million containers 
were handled by more than 9,000 workers, which means approximately 1,220 
containers per worker. In 2013 more than 20 million containers were handled 
by 13,633 workers, which means 1500 containers per worker3 (PMA 2014: 1). 
In the ports of LA/LB the effectiveness per worker is, according to the stats, 
even higher, as 14.6 million containers in 2013 were handled by 8,349 
workers, which amounts to no less than 1750 containers per worker 
(portoflosangeles.org 2014; polb.com 2014; PMAnet.org 2014). A figure that 
might indicate that the effectiveness in the ports of LA/LB are significantly 
higher than the rest due to their good infrastructure and logistics services as 
described above. 
Thus, according to these relative figures, the trade of dockworkers is 
challenged, since their employers seem able to raise the output without 
expanding the labour force accordingly – something that at the same time 
threatens their marketplace bargaining power. However, this can also turn out 
as a trend that is strengthening the workplace bargaining power of the 
                                                   
3 Note that the number of dockworkers has fallen from 2006 to 2013. However, this should be 
connected to the falling number of containers that have gone through the West Coast ports 
since the financial crisis that hit the US in 2007/2008. This sudden fall in employment thus 
cannot be connected directly to the trends of logistics and automation. 
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dockworkers, since the value of every dockworker grows together with the 
container/man ratio (more on this in the sub-conclusion of this subchapter). 
 
5.1.3. The Port of Hong Kong 
This section will provide a brief outline of the history and the recent figures of 
the Port of Hong Kong. The section will thus situate the port within the history 
of global trade and containerisation and visualise its figures and trends as a 
global port. 
 
In order to understand the present political and economic situation of the Port 
of Hong Kong, it is necessary to go back as far as to 1842 – the year when 
Hong Kong was occupied by the British after the First Opium War with China. 
Although Hong Kong was given back to China in 1997, it received the status of 
a SAR, which allowed it to maintain its economic system for the next 50 years 
(Loughlin & Pannell 2010: 50). A fact that is important to bring with us in the 
analysis, especially to the section on the 2013 strike, as Hong Kong’s SAR 
status means that its political and economic features are different, to which 
reason ITF has been able to organise in Hong Kong – something it has not 
been able to in the rest of China, since ITF has just recently made a MOU with 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Hamilton 2014). 
Already by the beginning of the 20th century Hong Kong was an important 
global port, not least due to the rising world trade with China. By 1935 it was 
one of the world’s biggest ports, and during the containerisation it was able to 
keep up with the technological pace, so after the handover to the Chinese, by 
1999, it became the world’s biggest port in terms of TEU throughput. A 
position it held until 2005 (Loughlin & Pannell 2010: 50). 
In 2012 container traffic through Hong Kong fell by 5.2 percent, and the 
port had dropped to a third place with more than 23 million TEU containers 
handled by the port that year, overtaken by the ports of Shanghai and 
Singapore. In 2013 (the year of the big strike) it dropped to a fourth place with 
a TEU throughput of more than 22 million, overtaken by the neighbouring 
port of Shenzhen. By 2013 Shanghai was the world’s biggest port with a TEU 
throughput of more than 33.5 million (Wall Street Journal Asia 2013; 
worldshipping.org 2014B; Hong Kong Port Development Council 2014: 13). 
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Despite its higher fees and slightly greater distance from the exporting 
factories (which may be the root causes to its recent drop), Hong Kong is still 
among the favourite ports, since it has the most frequent connections to the 
US, Europe, and the rest of Asia, and is one of the world’s most efficient ports 
(Herald Tribune 2013). With that in mind, let us take a closer look at the 
employees in the Port of Hong Kong. 
 
Whereas containers are easily counted in the standard of TEUs, port 
employment is not as tangible a measure as one might have imagined4. Ports 
generate several jobs in their local/regional markets, and these figures are 
often added to the direct port jobs on port homepages as well as in academic 
literature. At the same time, within the direct port jobs there are several 
different job categories, which are not necessarily as clear as one might hope. 
Due to this uncertainty it is impossible to provide an exact comparison of the 
Port of Hong Kong and the ports of the American West Coast in terms of 
labour. However, what is possible, and far more relevant to this analysis, is to 
provide a trend of the employment compared to the TEU throughput of the 
two ports, as we have done above for the American West Coast ports. Thus, 
here follows a similar assessment for the Port of Hong Kong. 
Like the ports on the American West Coast, the Port of Hong Kong has seen 
a fall in employment, when compared to its TEU throughput. Whereas the 
port handled around 18 million TEU containers in 2001 with a workforce of 
just under 90,000 persons (comprised of the four job categories of port 
operations, ship operations, cargo services, and land transport and storage), 
it handled more than 24 million TEU containers in 2011 with a workforce of 
less than 85,000 persons (OECD 2013A: 12, 26). Thus the Port of Hong Kong 
has in ten years been able to grow its production by approximately one third, 
while at the same downsizing its workforce by around five percent. 
These figures show the vulnerability of dockworkers due to the trends of 
automation and logistics, decreasing their scarcity and thus their marketplace 
bargaining power. However, at the same time they show that the dockworkers 
left on the docks are becoming increasingly important for the ports to 
                                                   
4 A point that is clearly visualised with the employment stats of Hong Kong, as these are more 
than six times higher than those of the American West Coast ports despite their equal sizes in 
terms of TEU throughput. 
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function. If we divide the number of containers with the number of workers, 
in 2001 there were around 200 containers a year for every worker. In 2011 
that number had risen to approximately 290 containers. 
The figures, however, also show the mentioned intangibility of labour. 
Note, in this regard, that the figures of the American West Coast are 
significantly higher, which might be due to different methods of calculating. 
Thus, if we remove the two job categories of cargo services and land transport 
and storage, we are left with the two job categories of port and ship 
operations, which, put together, in 2001 and 2011 comprise around 25,000 
port jobs (OECD 2013A: 26). The 18 million TEU containers handled in 2001 
consequently means approximately 720 containers per worker, while the 24 
million TEU containers handled in 2011 means approximately 975 containers 
per worker. These figures are closer to the American West Coast figures, but 
as we still do not know the methods used by OECD (comprising the Hong 
Kong labour figures) and PMA (comprising the American West Coast labour 
figures), respectively, and as a comparison is not the main task of this 
analysis, we will only use these figures to support the important finding that 
the container/man ratio is rising in the ports of both Hong Kong and the 
American West Coast. 
 
5.1.4. The 2012 Los Angeles/Long Beach strike 
This section will present the strike that took place in the ports of LA/LB in 
2012 as an extension to the case study of the port complex. The section will 
analyse how the structural (and to some extent associational) bargaining 
power of the dockworkers affected the strike and its outcome. 
 
On the 27th of November 2012 clerical workers in the ports of LA/LB went on 
strike due to their accusations that their employers had been outsourcing 
clerical jobs to countries with cheaper labour, as computers have made many 
of the clerical tasks possible to perform without having to be at the port (NY 
Times 2012). 
As explained earlier in the analysis, the containerisation and growing 
automation and logistics services have made the ports increasingly capital-
intensive, which consequently has resulted in fewer jobs per container, but 
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more high-skill jobs. Clerical functions are a very good example of this, which 
is why we count them into our term of dockworkers. As this section will show, 
there is also a high degree of interconnectedness as well as solidarity amongst 
the different dockworkers at the port. 
The clerical workers of LA/LB were represented by the West American port 
worker trade union International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) (a 
member of ITF), who brought the accusations of the outsourced jobs. An 
accusation that the employers, represented by the Los Angeles/Long Beach 
Harbor Employers Association (HEA), rejected. As a result, the negotiations 
did not begin before two days after the strike was initiated. The strike ended 
eight days after it had begun; late night on the 4th of December (NY Times 
2012; Daily Breeze 2012). 
According to a spokesman for the HEA, Steve Getzug, who was cited in the 
New York Times in the beginning of the strike, “there is [clearly] a near-term 
economic impact that expands each day for longshoremen, truckers, 
railroad engineers and warehouse workers”. He further added that “anyone 
connected with the shipping chain is not drawing a paycheck today, because 
of the actions of some of the highest-paid clerical workers in America” 
(Getzug in NY Times 2012). 
Although the statements are obviously tactical in that Getzug tries to 
portray the clerical workers as disloyal and ‘spoiled’, they still provide 
important information to this analysis. The first important notion in the 
statements is that the work stoppage of the clerical workers affects a long 
chain of workers, who, consequently, are not able to do their jobs, which is a 
significant indication of strong workplace bargaining power of the clerical 
workers. The other important notion is the statement about the LA/LB port 
clerical workers being some of the highest-paid clerical workers in the US. It 
has not been possible for us to check up on the argument, but if it is in fact 
true, it is a clear indication of a high general bargaining power of the clerical 
workers, since good working conditions, e.g. high wages, are often the 
outcome of high bargaining power. 
The statement that the clerical worker strike stopped a long chain of work is 
backed up by several newspaper and journal articles, which have summed up 
the economic consequences for the ports of LA/LB (NYTimes.com 2012; 
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Journal of Commerce 2012; Press-Telegram 2012; Daily Breeze 2012). 
However, according to the New York Times, the just 600 striking clerical 
workers were backed up by thousands of unionised longshoremen, who 
respected the picket lines made by the clerical workers (NYTimes.com 2012). 
This points more towards strong associational, rather than structural, 
bargaining power, and is a good example of the interconnectedness between 
the two theoretical terms. It may even be an indication that the clerical 
workers themselves do not have enough workplace bargaining power to shut 
down the entire chain. 
With the help from the longshoremen, however, the clerical workers were 
able to shut down 10 of the 14 container terminals in the ports of LA/LB, 
which meant that several vessels were diverted to other ports, resulting in 
huge economic losses for the two ports. A local newspaper article has 
economists estimating that the strike ended up costing a little more than USD 
1 billion a day for the region of Southern California, which other sources in the 
article reject with the argument that some vessels waited outside the ports 
during the strike in order to be served as soon as the strike ended (Daily 
Breeze 2012). A New York Times article, on the other hand, has officials from 
the Port of Long Beach estimating a loss for the region of USD 650 million 
(NYTimes.com 2013). These figures support the analysis of a strong workplace 
(or associational due to the longshoremen help) bargaining power, since the 
strike had major implications for not just the two ports, but for the whole 
region. The aforementioned data saying that 40 percent of American imports 
come through these two ports even points toward implications for the whole 
country. 
Quite unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain information on the 
agreement the two sides ended up with, as neither the union nor the 
employers were willing to offer details on this to the newspapers 
(NYTimes.com 2012; Daily Breeze 2012). This would have served the analysis 
with strong empirical evidence on the general bargaining power of the clerical 
workers. 
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5.1.5. The 2013 Hong Kong strike 
This section will present the 2013 strike in the Port of Hong Kong as an 
extension to the case study of the port. The section will analyse how the 
structural (and to some extent associational) bargaining power of the 
dockworkers affected the strike and its outcome. 
 
Exactly four months and one day after the LA/LB strike began, on March 28, 
2013, around 450 subcontracted dockworkers, mostly crane operators and 
stevedores, employed under Hongkong International Terminals (HIT) at the 
Port of Hong Kong, walked off work, starting what turned out to be no less 
than a 40-day strike. HIT is owned by Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), the 
largest port operator in Hong Kong Port, at the time operating 16 out of 24 
deep-water ship berths and sitting on a market share of 70 percent, when 
measured in port handling volumes. According to the unions the striking 
workers comprised 30 to 40 percent of the Hong Kong dockworkers serving 
HPH (Bloomberg.com 2013; Journal of Commerce 2013; Wall Street Journal 
Asia 2013). 
The strike was led by the Union of Hong Kong Dockers (UHKD), an affiliate 
to ITF, and called for a 20 percent wage increase for the subcontracted 
workers, who, according to themselves (quoted in the Herald Tribune (2013)), 
earn USD 7 an hour. Subcontracted workers stand for around two-thirds of 
the workers of HPH and more than third of its costs (Financial Times 2013) – 
a fact that indicates that subcontracting is also threatening dockworkers. 
According to the Journal of Commerce (2013), a journal on global trade, 
transportation, and logistics, more than 100 vessels went to other ports during 
the strike, and the ones that stayed, according to the Herald Tribune (2013) 
experienced waiting times of up t0 60 hours – 20 times the normal waiting 
time of 3 hours. With an increasing amount of goods dependent on JIT 
production, e.g. foodstuffs, livestock, and goods that are ordered by the 
retailer to meet a time sensitive demand, these delays may have had crucial 
impacts for the port as well as the retailers in the end of the GVCs. 
Consequently, according to HPH executives quoted in the Herald Tribune 
(2013), HPH daily suffered a loss of 5 million Hong Kong dollars (equivalent 
to approximately USD 650,000). These figures showcase the workplace 
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bargaining power of the striking dockworkers, as they were able to bruise their 
employers quite hard. Once again, though, it is impossible to leave the 
associational power out of the equation, as the union’s strike fund of 650,000 
Hong Kong dollars (approximately USD 85,000) undoubtedly helped the 
strikers persist the 40 days that the strike went on for (Herald Tribune 2013). 
The strike ended on the 6th of May with, among others, a settlement of a 9.8 
percent wage increase for all job types together with promises of further 
negotiations on working conditions and an earlier agreement of overtime 
compensation of 1.4 times the hourly wage, which ITF called “a victory for the 
union” in a statement issued the 25th of April (ITFGlobal.org 2013A). During 
the strike, however, one of the contractors threatened firing its striking 
employees, but with the settlement the employer side promised not to make 
any retaliation against the strikers (OECD 2013A: 21; Journal of Commerce 
2013; ITFGlobal.org 2013A; 2013B; Wall Street Journal 2013). 
The successful outcome of the strike is a good indication of a strong general 
bargaining power of the dockworkers’ of Hong Kong. However, in the Herald 
Tribune (2013) article (issued during the strike and thus before the 
settlement) one dockworker is arguing that he has seen so many pay cuts that 
he is making less money than he did 10 years ago, counting inflation. If that is 
in fact true, the high bargaining power may be a newfound feature of the Hong 
Kong dockworkers. Hong Kong unions, and thus the general associational 
power, have historically been weak. During the last years, however, the 
increasing inequality and house prices have given birth to several great 
protests in Hong Kong, according to the Herald Tribune (2013) (Wall Street 
Journal Asia 2013). 
 
5.1.6. Sub-conclusion 
The increasing global trade and the constant rise of GVCs are in large part due 
to containerisation. Bonacich & Wilson (2008: 50-51) even go as far as 
concluding that “without [containerisation], globalization would have been 
immensely slowed down”. As stated in the introductory chapter, maritime 
shipping stands for the far majority of global trade, and as global trade is 
increasing, more and more goods go through container ports on their way 
from factory to retailer. This places container ports as pivotal nodes in the 
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numerous GVCs that make up most of global trade, making dockworkers an 
indispensable cog in the global assembly line. 
With this analytical subchapter on dockworkers’ structural bargaining 
power we have analysed the positive and negative implications that their 
position in the global economic system has brought the dockworkers. As 
shown, their position has given them a natural high workplace bargaining 
power. However, this power has also led employers to search for ways to limit 
their reliance on the powerful and unreliable factor of labour. During the 
beginning of containerisation employment figures for dockworkers decreased 
significantly and in the contemporary era of containerisation, automation is a 
new factor that has meant that one employee can handle more containers, 
consequently decreasing the relative workforce on the docks. This is a great 
threat to dockworkers, but so far a threat that has been reduced because of the 
still rising trade figures. However, if the rising trade trends come to a halt – as 
has been the case during the on-going financial crisis – the threat may 
materialise. This will be a weakening factor for the marketplace bargaining 
power of dockworkers. 
As more dockworkers are moved to the unemployment line, the 
marketplace bargaining power of the still employed dockworkers is weakened, 
as there is a big labour force outside the ports waiting to take whatever falls off 
the carcass. Of course, the actual state and size of the dockworker labour force 
standing outside the ports deserves its own investigation, as it is impossible, 
for instance, to say with certainty whether the dockworkers disappearing from 
the employment statistics were in fact fired or merely retired, and thus if they 
are or are not available for the employers to use as a threat in a bargaining 
with the employees. Thus, in this analysis we can only point toward a possibly 
weakened marketplace bargaining power, if the dockworker employment 
figures start falling. 
However, the increasing container/man ratio is not necessarily only a bad 
thing for the bargaining power of dockworkers. The many automated 
processes on the ports demand more high-skilled labour, heightening the 
dockworkers’ marketplace bargaining power, as high-skilled labour is most 
often scarcer than low-skilled labour. The higher skills and the more 
containers handled per docker consequently raise the value of the 
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dockworkers and thus also their workplace bargaining power. Bonacich & 
Wilson (2008: 177) conclude that containerisation has made dockers 
increasingly important, but at the same time less costly due to their decreasing 
amounts, which has meant that employers have given in to employee demands 
rather than risking work stoppages. 
Speaking for the high value of dock labour, but against the low costs is an 
OECD (2013B) report that concludes that labour costs comprise 50-70 percent 
of the total operating costs at container terminals, and that the labour costs of 
one shipped container in the Port of Los Angeles are close to USD 200. 
The increasing geographical and firm dispersion that the many GVCs have 
brought into global trade have given rise to yet another factor that has shown 
to both posing threats and advantages to the dockworkers’ bargaining power; 
namely the logistics revolution. Logistical planning has become a necessity 
with the increasingly complex GVCs and has been made possible by the still 
on-going automation. This has also hit the ports with consequences of 
subcontracting, outsourcing, and JIT production. Where the analysis finds 
that the two former have been threatening dockworkers, the latter may, on the 
contrary, have increased their bargaining position. Delays in the ports due to, 
for instance, work stoppages will have greater consequences than without JIT 
production, as the retailers in the end of the GVCs expect their goods at a 
certain time in order to meet the demand. Perishable goods, and other goods 
totally dependent on JIT production, will even go to waste if they have to wait 
for too long. 
The logistic wave that has hit the docks is thus again a good example of the 
multifaceted consequences of the recent trends of maritime shipping. 
 
As should be apparent from this analytical subchapter, it is rather difficult to 
get a full image of the structural bargaining power of dockworkers. Some 
trends point toward a weakened bargaining power, some trends point toward 
a strengthened, and most trends point in both directions. That is a good 
example of the big borderline territory that exists between structural and 
associational bargaining power, as union organisation can to a large degree 
determine whether a trend ends up being an advantage or a disadvantage for 
the dockworkers. The next analytical subchapter will therefore engage in an 
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analysis of the associational bargaining power of dockworkers in order to 
provide a more complete image of dockworkers’ overall bargaining power. 
 
5.2. Dockworkers’ associational bargaining power 
This subchapter will analyse the associational bargaining power of 
dockworkers. Silver’s conceptualisation of associational bargaining power will 
be used to explore this source of labour’s power.  
The dockworkers’ associational bargaining power will be analysed through 
an assessment of, first, the associational bargaining power of ITF, second the 
counter organisation of IDC, third the solidarity amongst dockworkers, and 
fourth the solidarity between dockworkers and seafarers before ending with 
a sub-conclusion. 
 
Before going into the substantial analysis it is worth considering how 
associational bargaining power can be measured at all, as it turns out that 
there are several problems with that. Building upon Silver’s concepts we will 
therefore here present some further developments and distinctions that we 
have developed and find useful in analysing the associational bargaining 
power of dockworkers. The following considerations are thus not Silver’s, but 
our own. 
First of all, broadly speaking, associational bargaining power can be divided 
into two: the associational bargaining power that comes from institutions and 
the one that derives from a sense of solidarity. The institutional sense can be 
equated to the way Cumbers et al. present institutional labour, i.e. labour 
seen as its collective organisation. Since we want to focus on the global trends 
(to the extent it is possible) of trade and how that affects labour, we 
investigate the GUF of the dockworkers, ITF. The reasoning and limitations of 
that particular choice can be found in the methodology section. 
Secondly, is membership numbers a sufficient proxy for associational 
bargaining power? If not, what can be used as a proxy? And is quantitative 
measures enough? The approach taken in this analytical subchapter seeks to 
cover multiple aspects of what constitutes associational bargaining power. 
These include organisational figures such as more quantitative proxies, e.g. 
number of affiliates and number of workers being represented. More 
 60 
qualitative measures will also be taken into account. These include the 
solidarity amongst dockers, the solidarity with seafarers, and their results in 
making collective agreements with the employers. Solidarity is used as a 
concept to encompass the ties and associational strength of the dockers. As it 
will be discussed below, solidarity is not a sufficient condition for an effective 
and political active organisation, but it is a unique resource that can be 
mobilised and an important element of most struggles. 
Thirdly, bargaining power of labour should always be put in relation to the 
bargaining power of capital. That is, if capital is seen as the opponent of 
labour. It is obvious that the result of a negotiation will not be determined by 
the power of one side alone. The overall bargaining power – structural and 
associational bargaining power combined – of labour has to be contrasted to 
bargaining power of capital/the employer in order to foresee whether labour 
will achieve any gains. However, associational bargaining power differs from 
structural bargaining power in how relational it is. This can be subscribed to 
the fact that the structure in itself is not an actor, but the association is. The 
structure can give an actor a potential powerful position and affect 
associations’ behaviour, whereas an association is embodying the actual 
power. As the long-standing structure-agent debate informs us, actors too 
affect the structure, but that occurs over a longer period of time. The fact that 
the associational bargaining power can be equated to an actor makes that type 
of bargaining power somewhat more intertwined with the direct opponent, the 
employers’ organisation. The action of a trade union one day directly 
influences the decision of the employer the next and vice versa. Put simply, 
the associational bargaining power can be seen as a zero-sum game 5 . 
Structures frame the potential behaviour of both labour and capital. The same 
structural feature, say JIT production, can give potential power for both 
employers and employees. In short, the employers’ associational bargaining 
power should be measured too in order to get the full picture ITF’s bargaining 
power, or at least an indication of their relational power position should be 
                                                   
5 Insofar that both ITF and TNCs have an interest in making collective agreements there are 
obvious overlaps in interests, hence it cannot be seen as a zero-sum game. The overlap in 
interests (between some employers and unions) appears because both sides need to be  
organised in order to make agreements possible.  
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provided. This will be done by looking at the IBF that has been agreed by ITF 
and employers. 
Fourthly, one can distinguish between the potential and actual power. The 
potential associational bargaining power can be said to be both. What should 
be measured? As resource mobilisation theory proscribes, it is not enough to 
have the resources in a given organisation. Those resources must also be 
mobilised (for more on resource mobilisation theory see Andersen and 
Omwaka 2013). A resource can be the sense of belonging to the group, i.e. 
solidarity (see the discussion on solidarity below). It is, however, not a given 
that the bonds of solidarity will transform into action. Resources must be 
utilised and applied most effectively. And what works in one context might not 
work in another. Resources can never be applied in a similar way, which leads 
us to the final problem in measuring associational bargaining power: 
Finally, whether an organisation is well organised depends on the contexts 
it is in. Time, space, and institutional context do matter. A certain type of 
organisation or association might be deemed very effective in one institutional 
setting, but not in another. Take for example community level bargaining 
power: It is only effective and a useful type of associational bargaining power 
that can secure high wages and good working conditions, when jobs cannot 
move elsewhere to other communities. The level at which the associational 
bargaining power is meaningful depends on which level capital operates. 
When capital is highly mobile labour’s organisation has to follow suit. In 
today’s production chain capital is in many cases mobile on the global level 
(Silver 2003: 113). 
 
The analysis will deal with different aspects of how strong the union, ITF, is. It 
will draw on some core data about ITF, which has been presented above. It 
will then introduce and apply the term solidarity, which is a key concept for 
what constitutes associational bargaining power. Finally, some links between 
the seafarers and dockworkers will be presented, because, as it will be argued, 
the level of associational bargaining power between the two trades is 
interdependent. The interviews we conducted with both the dockworkers 
section and the seafarers section will be used in this analysis both as primary 
sources and in order to back up and illustrate points. 
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5.2.1. The associational bargaining power of ITF  
In the historical section some core data and history on ITF was presented. 
With regard to the membership data a key finding is that ITF is a complex 
organisation with a complex membership composition. A membership 
composition that is diverse both in terms of occupational trade and region. 
Another key finding is that the trends in the membership composition follow 
the general trends in occupational patterns within the transportation sector. 
The final finding that will be presented here. Now, the three findings will be 
considered in more detail. 
David Harvey (2006) coined the term uneven development in order to 
describe capitalism. The uneven development occurs both regional and 
sectorial, whereby some sectors and geographical regions grow more than 
others. For ITF it means that their different members are bound to have 
conflict of interest with other groups of workers, either due to their regional 
and/or occupational differences. It is precisely these potential divisions that 
the ITF by its very existence seeks to diminish. The strong bold work against 
internal division greatly increases the associational bargaining power. As we 
shall see ITF managed to overcome many of the divisions between the dockers 
and seafarers. 
The second point, that ITF’s organisation patterns, thus their associational 
bargaining strength, follow general trends in trade patterns, is reflected in 
ITF’s membership numbers. When there was a movement of the employment 
patterns and more labour was recruited from the Eastern part of the world, 
there was a drop in the overall membership of ITF. Fabrizio Barcelona, 
secretary in the ITF seafarers section, denotes it as a ‘loss of a generation’ 
when speaking of what happened to the seafarers profession in the Western 
part of the world:  
 
I would say that [the reason for the younger generation being less unionised is] 
because of the loss of the seafarers’ profession in the Western part of the world to 
the advantage of the Eastern part and the Southern part of the globe. I think we 
have lost a generation or a couple of generations of people who joined the ship 
when they were younger and that we didn't have access to them, so they have 
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grown up with the idea that it was no necessity to be part of a trade union 
(Barcelona 2014). 
 
Obviously more evidence is needed if one were to prove a direct correlation 
between the drop in membership, thus weakened associational bargaining 
power, and the shift in the composition of the labour force. Yet, it is the 
analysis of the seafarers section that such a link can be established, at least 
with regard to the seafarers. Such a link demonstrates how entangled the 
structural and associational bargaining power is. 
The point taken from the historical description of ITF was that the long 
history and tradition of well-organised sectors in itself increases the 
associational bargaining power, because it enhances the idea of power (Silver 
2003: 16). The point is that a group of workers have more confidence in their 
ability to win a dispute, if there is a historical record of victories. 
Overall, one can conclude that ITF historically has been a strong GUF, 
which gives them a high level of associational bargaining power. Although, as 
discussed above, one must include the employers’ associational bargaining 
power in order to get the full picture. The drop in membership from 1959 to 
1970 is clear evidence that the change in ship registration pattern did increase 
the ship owners’ relative associational bargaining power. 
 
5.2.2. A rival organisation – International Dockworkers Council 
One area that is largely relevant in the discussion of ITF is the existence of a 
rival union, International Dockworkers Council (IDC). It emerged from the 
long-running dispute in the port of Liverpool in the late 1990s and contains 
some of the more left-wing (trans)port unions in particular in Europe – 
mainly France, Greece, Spain and Sweden (Turnbull 2010: pp. 337-338). 
Members of the IDC see ITF as “reformist” (Pigenet 2012: 145). In addition to 
this conflict Turnbull also describes the tension between ITF and the regional 
organisation of ETF, the European Transport Workers’ Federation: 
 
In addition to the overt division between the ETF and IDC there are also covert 
‘tensions’ between the ETF and the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF), of which the former is now the regional organization. Prior to the creation 
of the ETF in 1999, when it joined the regional structures of the ITF, European 
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transport unions were represented by the Federation of Transport Workers’ 
Unions in the European Union (FST) […] There had always been an ‘uneasy’ 
relationship between the ITF and the FST, only partially resolved by an 
agreement in 1994 recognizing the primary role of the FST with respect to the 
institutions of the EU and of the ITF for the coordination of international 
solidarity and relations with non-EU institutions (Turnbull 2010: 337-338). 
 
Some of the tension might lie in the fact that Europe in general has been much 
more unionised, thus several viable alternatives could co-exist at the same 
time. The tensions are not more prominent than they can be overcome when a 
greater outer threat appears. During struggles on the European waterfront, 
the ITF/ETF and IDC coordinated closely both timing and tactics (Turnbull 
2010: 341). And in the US the already mentioned ILWU is affiliated to both 
the ITF and IDC. Representatives of both international bodies attended a 
conference hosted by the ILWU in August 2001, which led to a joint call for 
international solidarity in the campaign against an EU directive (Turnbull 
2010: 341). 
One can easily conclude that having several unions makes it easier for the 
employers to divide and conquer, which is the main reason for many union 
mergers. However, on the contrary it might strengthen the dockworkers in 
their common struggle for two reasons. IDC, which only organises 
dockworkers, might better represent the ‘true’6 interest of the dockers due to 
the fact that it is a union that only represents dockers. In turn, this might 
enhance their identity and solidarity amongst the dockers. As we shall see, 
strong bonds of solidarity is vital for associational union power. Moreover, the 
IDC can play an interesting role by having a more radical stance, because ITF 
can then be the moderate, which can strengthen their negotiating position. 
However, this requires some level of coordination between the two unions, 
which has happened at several occasions (for examples see Turnbull 2010). 
It is hard to judge whether the existence of IDC strengthens or weakens the 
position of the dockworkers in general, since it depends on whether the 
dockworkers’ interests are actually better being represented by IDC. Since 
Europe is the stronghold of IDC, the split between IDC and ITF can be seen 
not as ideological but as an expression of geographical differences. Assuming 
                                                   
6 Whatever that is. 
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that ITF represents the dockworkers generally, the existence of IDC weakens 
ITF’s associational bargaining power. 
 
5.2.3. Solidarity amongst dockworkers 
Amongst dockworkers there has historically been strong ties of solidarity, 
which is partly due to the insecure nature of the trade: highly casualised and 
precarious. Furthermore it is one of the most dangerous trades with a high 
level of accidents. In this sense there was a great level of mutual 
understanding of the need to act as a collective. There was a high degree of 
loyalty to the union leader and if a strike was called everyone followed suit. 
The parole ‘one out, all out’ was taken very seriously (Turnbull 1992: 295). 
Paula Hamilton, assistant secretary in the dockers section of ITF, explained to 
us that the strong identity of being a docker is not only evident in the Western 
countries, where the dockworkers traditionally have been strongest: 
 
Dockers’ unions have always had that historic tight-knit kind of 'family bond' – 
you know – that real connection of being ‘dockers’. And they have that really 
strong association of being ‘a docker’ no matter where they are around the world. 
And that is really one of the strengths of our section (Hamilton 2014). 
 
This feeling of being a docker is essential for solidarity, because, as explained 
above, actions of solidarity reassures the relationship to the group. The 
solidarity was not only occupational. As Silver proscribed, also non-working 
social relations matter. In particular, in the 1950s in Britain there was, like 
with the miners, an overlap between the occupation and the community  
(Turnbull 1992: 295). This increases the level of solidarity significantly, thus 
gives a high associational bargaining power. The standardisation, e.g. the 
containerisation and automation of the work, broke up some of those 
communities from the 1970s onwards and there was a drop in the idea of 
power – also reflected in the membership numbers above. Here it is evident 
that there is a connection between the structural bargaining power and the 
associational bargaining power. The latter understood both in the term of 
solidarity and the institutionalisation. 
As Hamilton pointed out, the feeling of solidarity is global due to the shared 
conditions and the fact that it is felt “around the world”. In this sense we can 
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see that the solidarity goes beyond the community. The conditions they share 
are harsh, even though labour standards in some ports might be better. 
 
So there are definitely emotional links. But also a very practical kind of ... well 
they work, they are a docker and we know what it is like to be a docker and there 
is that kind of association because it is such a distinct type of work. And it is a 
very dangerous job a lot of the time (Hamilton 2014).  
 
These harsh conditions they share aid to strengthen the bonds of solidarity 
with dockworkers elsewhere: 
 
I would say there are distinctive elements to the type of solidarity dockers’ unions 
provide, but I am not going to talk on tape about it. Because I can't. But there is ... 
There is a very ... You know, if a docker dies on a terminal, if that is 
communicated amongst our affiliates everyone feels it (Hamilton 2014). 
 
These instances might spark specific solidarity actions, as it was the case 
below: 
 
If something specific happens, for instance, there was a solidarity campaign quite 
a number of years ago, maybe six years ago, where a union was trying to organise 
dockworkers in India and they were, the union leaders, were taken to a quarry 
and beat up, and that actually really stimulated our dockers’ unions to support 
that union – to get a collective agreement in that port (Hamilton 2014). 
 
The solidarity not only comes from an emotional collective feeling, even 
though that might be the spark to actions being taken. They not only share 
working conditions, they are also part of the same node of the production 
chain, stressing their structural bargaining power. As Hamilton puts it: 
 
Well I think we all know how the maritime network works and how logistics and 
supply chains work, so it got to move and it got to go through a port at some stage 
– no matter what it is. So it is a vulnerability within every supply chain dependent 
on maritime shipping (Hamilton 2014). 
 
This gives them potential power (Hamilton 2014), which they themselves are 
aware of. The consciousness gives them the idea of power, which in turn helps 
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them in strikes and other actions where strong solidarity bonds are needed, 
because they know that they can win gains when they organise collectively. Yet 
again, we see a link between how the structural bargaining power can 
transcend into associational bargaining power. “And dockers’ unions are 
generally quite politically aware and there is usually good member 
education, so I think there are certain elements that make it distinctive” 
(Hamilton 2014). 
However, it is not only the dockers themselves that are aware of their 
position. The employers are too: 
 
They [the dockworkers] are a choke point, which is why there is so much pressure 
on organised labour […] in the ports. Because they are, we are, seen as the 
Neanderthals now. As the problem rather than the solution. And actually, you 
know, our unions are actually a lot of the time extremely progressive in terms of 
working with the industry to find solutions to things. But it is how we are 
portrayed [like Neanderthals] (Hamilton 2014). 
 
Because the employers know it too, they seek to diminish the power of the 
unions. Sometimes by “avoiding the unions” (Hamilton 2014), by shifting the 
use of labour to less organised ports, and by making the workers compete with 
each other, hence making them “their own worst enemies” (Hamilton 2014). 
To sum up, several of the conditions that have been laid out in the 
definition of the solidarity is present. The dockers have a high level of their 
awareness, which constitutes them as a political subject. They share 
conditions and values, and there is a sense of community. Also, judging from 
Hamilton’s words, and the literature in general, it is safe to say that there are 
high levels of solidarity amongst dockers. 
 
5.2.4. Solidarity between dockworkers and seafarers 
ITF also organises the seafarers, a group of workers that traditionally have 
worked very closely together with the dockworkers. The welfare and strength 
of one of the trades were linked to the power position of the other. This 
historical link can be seen for instance by the fact that the immediate 
predecessor to the ITF was the International Federation of Ship, Dock and 
River Workers set up by British sailors. Also, one of historically major 
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victories of the dockworkers was that they were able to get the right to ‘load 
and unload’ the ships. This defined division of labour was crucial in 
establishing dockworkers as a distinctive trade with its own rights and 
interests (Pigenet 2012: 143). Thus, the seafarers did not have to do the 
unloading. On the other hand, if the seafarers did so, because they were asked 
to by their employer, they would have taken the work from the dockers. In 
other words, the bargaining power of the dockworkers cannot be considered 
without having the seafarers in the picture. Therefore this analytical section 
will draw in some perspectives on the organisation of, and the solidarity links 
to, the seafarers. 
Fabrizio Barcelona, assistant secretary of the seafarers section in the ITF, 
talks about two types of solidarity between seafarers and dockers: one where 
the dockers and seafarers in a tangible way help each other and one that is 
more intangible, e.g. letters of support. He illustrates how solidarity in the 
first sense concretely can appear: 
 
I remember in the past there has been a big dispute in a big terminal in Australia. 
The dockers there were lockouted, because [the employers] wanted to change 
completely the terms and conditions of their employment agreement. They 
wanted to employ people at different rates, and lose all the benefits that the 
dockers have acquired. So there has been a strong campaign that involved 
seafarers in a very simple way. They were asked to attach some stickers on the 
containers they transported. That was a way for the seafarers to demonstrate that 
they supported the dockers. And there has been a lockout and a big rally in the 
particular port. In the end, after a dispute of 6 months, the government ... [the 
dockers] managed to get what they wanted. I mean, [they managed to] sit at the 
table and discuss the changes, rather than the changes being imposed (Barcelona 
2014). 
 
The dispute that Barcelona speaks of was in 2007 in Kembla Port and was 
about who should discharge the ship, i.e. unload it, which we have already 
established is essential work for the dockers to do. The company wanted the 
seafarers to do it, but with joint effort with the dockers, several ports refused 
to unload the ships and the company backed down. It was a Malta-registered 
(a FOC country) company that ITF has been chasing around the world for 
several months (Sydney Morning Herald 2007A; 2007B). 
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In the Kembla Port dispute both types of solidarity was present. Above is 
the practical one, i.e. the refusal of discharging the ship, and messages of 
solidarity. 
 
And solidarity in a different situation when seafarers from a company are 
victimised or are marginalised. And as a result we have the solidarity from the 
unions around the world. That is less tangible, but still have the political weight 
[inaudible] to send a letter of protest to an embassy, to talk to other companies 
that deal with that particular operator. So there are different forms of solidarity 
(Barcelona 2014). 
 
In the case of the Kembla Port dispute there was widespread solidarity – both 
internationally, e.g. San Francisco and Strasbourg, and nationally from other 
unions such as the Transport Workers Union, the Health Services Union, the 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, and the Fire Brigade Employees 
Union (Green Left 2007). 
Amongst the seafarers, as is the case for dockers, there is a long tradition 
for internationalism, i.e. transnational solidarity actions. According to 
Barcelona that is because they travel around the world, but not only that: 
 
Yeah, but not only because they travel. It was like that, but until 40 years ago on 
board of an Italian ship you could find Italians only. Now on the same ship you 
can find two Italians, three Romanians, four Filipinos and two Indians. So they 
have learned by working and living together everyday. They become accustomed 
to different cultural types. Understanding better the differences between 
nationalities and the requirement that someone might have in terms of religion, 
food. So they learn better, so that is on the top of the fact that they in the past 
visited different ports around the globe, but now they really live shoulder to 
shoulder with someone different from their [own] nationality (Barcelona 2014). 
 
It was also the case that the maritime sector was crucial in spreading the 
workers’ organisation and unionism – for example in the case of forming ITF. 
This internationalism is needed, because the “seafarers’ industry is the only 
true global industry”, Barcelona (2014) proclaims. Maybe with the “exception 
of aviation” he adds. His explanation lies in the fact that terms and conditions 
are not determined by your nationality or in which country you work, but 
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based on the ship you work on and your position (Barcelona 2014). It is 
probably for this reason that ITF was the first GUF, in 2003, to make 
collective bargaining agreements directly with TNCs (Global Union 
Federations). This was achieved in 2003 and it shows both the nature of the 
maritime sector but it also says a lot about the strength of ITF and their 
associational bargaining power. 
 
5.2.5. Flags of convenience campaign 
The FOC campaign was a response to changes in the companies’ practice of 
ship registering. In the 1940s the ship owners began a practice of registering 
ships in countries. The main reason for registering in a country that your ship 
might never go to is to avoid labour regulation and get favourable tax laws and 
low registry fees (DeSombre 2008: 181). Countries (or registries such as 
Germany’s overseas registry) that have unacceptable low standards, are by 
ITF denoted FOC. As figure 4 shows, some registries have experienced an 
enormous increase in the number of ships being registered – such as Panama, 
Liberia and Bahamas. We can see in figure 5 that many of the registries that 
are FOC, are also countries commonly known for providing tax havens. That is 
no coincidence.  
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Figure 4 (DeSombre 2008: 182) 
 
 
Figure 5 (ITFGlobal.org 2014D) 
 
The FOC campaign aims to “eliminate the FOC system” completely. Knowing 
that it might take some time, or be impossible to do, they work to improve the 
conditions on FOC ships by imposing CBAs on the ships meanwhile 
(ITFGlobal.org 2014E). ITF is the only GUF that signs CBAs with companies 
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directly. In 2003 ITF started to negotiate with the Joint Negotiating Group 
(JNG), which consists of International Maritime Employers’ Committee 
(IMEC), Korean Shipowners’ Association (KSA), and International Mariners 
Management Association of Japan (IMMAJ) (ITFSeafarers.org 2014). ITF and 
JNG sits together in a so-called International Bargaining Forum, where they 
make the overall terms for the local and national agreements. According to 
Fabrizio Barcelona it is one of the greatest strengths of ITF. Before ITF made 
agreements with the individual ships, which is much more time-consuming 
for ITF. Now they have managed to improve the conditions at over 11,000 
FOC ships. Barcelona explains: 
 
We have about 6,000 of those agreements [agreements that are part of the IBF] 
today. Negotiated by our affiliates and the ship owner of that particular company. 
And then we have about 4-5,000 agreements that we still impose on ship owners 
that don't want to be part of that (Barcelona 2014). 
 
The dockers help the seafarers imposing the agreements, by physically going 
on board the ship when in port (Barcelona 2014). The sustained solidarity 
between seafarers and dockers’ unions has been an integral part of the FOC 
campaign from the very beginning. In 1948 a joint committee of seafarers and 
dockers unions was formed amid growing concern about working conditions 
on FOC ships. The first boycott of an FOC ship took place in 1949 (New 
Unionism Blog 2013). 
The campaign was extended to cover ports as well, when ITF’s 41st 
Congress in Durban, South Africa in 2006 decided to launch a ports of 
convenience (POC) campaign as well. The campaign aims at ports that have 
significantly lower standard than what is acceptable. It was formed 
 
In recognition of continuing employer and government threats to dockers’ jobs, to 
organised labour and to working conditions. […] ITF recognises that we need to 
organise globally, campaign globally and support each other globally to challenge 
the multi-nationals (ITFGlobal.org 2014F). 
 
The two campaigns have a joint website (http://www.dockers-seafarers.org/), 
which is used to share resources, inform about, and co-ordinate actions. Here 
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we see an example of how solidarity can be institutionalised/materialised and 
strengthen both the institutional and the solidarity associational bargaining 
power. 
The FOC/POC campaigns have not only forged stronger (and utilised 
already existing) bonds of solidarity between seafarers and dockers; they have 
also extended ITF’s institutional associational bargaining power by securing 
wider labour regulation – for example getting the Maritime Labour 
Convention ratified “by all major maritime nations” (New Unionism Blog 
2013). 
The overall success in organising this part of the chain has led to confidence 
and generated a broader discussion about supply chain organising. According 
to a (admittedly pro-labour) blog 
 
The ITF now puts a high importance on building out from its areas of traditional 
strength, and is looking to organise not just in the fast growing ‘land logistics’ 
sectors, but also link with unions in other sectors such as extraction, 
manufacturing, and retail sectors who sit and [sic] up and down stream from 
transport workers in global supply chains (New Unionism Blog 2013). 
 
5.2.5. Sub-conclusion 
The second analytical subchapter of this paper has applied Silver’s 
associational bargaining power concept to the dockworkers. The concept can 
be divided into two sub-categories, one regarding the institution of 
dockworkers and one regarding solidarity. The former has mainly been dealt 
with in relation to ITF. The latter has been dealt with by analysing the term, 
which in turn has formed the basis of an analysis of the solidarity amongst 
dockworkers and between dockworkers and seafarers. 
To summarise the findings it can be said that the level of institutional 
associational bargaining power, measured by the strength of the collective 
body, ITF, has historically been fairly high. In particular in relation to the fact 
that the industry has always been characterised by being very casual in its 
hiring-and-firing practices. Some of the institutional associational bargaining 
power also lies in the fact ITF conducts their own CBAs and IBFs. The fact 
that they are at this level in terms of institutionalising an overall unregulated 
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labour market is thanks to a more than 60 year-long campaign against the 
FOC ships and (in more recent times) FOC ports. 
In terms of solidarity, this chapter has shown that the associational 
bargaining power is intertwined with that of the seafarers. Examples have 
been provided, whereby the close ties have been proven. These ties are not 
just imaginary or based on shared values. They are also ‘real’, material. This is 
partly due to the shared conditions and partly due to the fact that they are all 
part of the same node in the production chain. On the basis of the interviews 
and cases it can be concluded that there is a unique sense of solidarity 
amongst dockers as well as between dockers and seafarers. 
We have seen that there is a close link between the different forms of 
bargaining power. Structural and associational bargaining power are 
influencing each other and at times the overlaps are so great that it is clear 
that the distinction is merely for analytical reasons. 
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6. Discussion: a global strategy? 
In this discussion we will touch upon some of the issues raised throughout the 
paper. First, the discussion will present the problem of ports moving eastward 
and give reasons for how that could constitute a whole research paper in itself. 
This will be followed by some of our findings that could form the basis for an 
analytical framework, if one were to conduct such a research paper. An 
example from Hong Kong and Shenzhen will then illustrate one of the 
theoretical underpinnings for the analytical framework, namely uneven 
development. Finally, we shall seek to comment on what strategy a GUF might 
apply in order to cope with uneven development. 
 
A reoccurring theme of this project has been the shift in location of the 
biggest ports – moving from Western Europe and USA to first and foremost 
China. 7 out the 10 largest ports are now Chinese and 9 out of 10 are Asian. 
This is something that we would have liked to investigate further, but due to 
space constraints, the need for a focus, and limited access to data on 
dockworkers in China we did not include this in the analysis. If one were to 
investigate this shift, it would have been interesting to look at whether this 
shift has changed the bargaining power of dockworkers. And here one would 
have to ask what dockworkers we are talking about – the Chinese or the 
Western ones? These questions would require yet another Roskilde University 
project, or something alike, nevertheless this project has laid down an 
analytical approach that could be replicated. Moreover, we have alluded to 
several overall trends that also would apply to Chinese ports. 
An insight that could serve as a basis for this investigation is the notion of 
potential and actual bargaining power. These concepts can form the 
basis for the analytical framework. As we have seen in the analysis, the 
structures can only give potential power – the actual power depends on how 
the actors play the cards they have been dealt. This is not to say that they are 
in an equal power relationship. Workers and employers have quite different 
types of power, which is determined by their position in the production chain 
as well as their social relations, namely whether they possess capital or not. 
Rather, the point is merely to avoid the too deterministic (and often 
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pessimistic) accounts of labour’s power in recent times. Labour and capital 
have agency and can in fact change the structures. 
Some of the trends that most likely affect all dockworkers in the world have 
been presented in this project. These trends are both technological 
(containerisation, logistical planning, automation), geographical (from the 
West to the East, outsourcing, competition between neighbouring ports) and 
organisational (greater division of labour, subcontracting, more integrated 
firms). As shown, these trends affect the composition of labour force and how 
workers are organised. How the workers are organised may vary in different 
local settings, however, Silver presents a fairly coherent narrative to why it 
occurs. To Silver, the relocation of production as well as automation are parts 
of fixes to the labour problem. This is inspired by Harvey, who says that crisis 
(of low profit) can never be solved, but only “reschedule” (Harvey in Silver 
2003: 41). The temporary solutions, i.e. the rescheduling of the crisis, are 
done through different fixes – spatial and technological. These fixes 
have been aided in their implementation by a political climate in which 
liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, and flexibility are prominent. 
Many have argued that these trends weaken labour’s position, both in 
terms of structural and associational bargaining power. The structural 
bargaining power has been weakened, because huge chunks of the globe’s 
population entered the labour market and became an inexhaustible pool of 
labour as the emerging economies opened up. The institutional associational 
bargaining power has similarly decreased. This has been due to the weakening 
of the sovereign nation states and the national unions in the West (Silver 
2003: 2). However, contrary to this pessimistic story our case study does give 
reasons for optimism. With the increased importance of information 
technology, complex logistics, and navigation systems together with an 
increased role to play for maritime shipping, potential power can be 
subscribed to the maritime workers. In fact, these trends might enhance their 
key position because of the increased importance of their bottleneck position. 
The companies will seek to undermine the union power, by increasing 
competition and move production elsewhere. The uneven development then 
follows. The geographical differences in development appear not only over 
long distances and across continents, but also on the very local level. Take for 
 77 
example the Shenzhen ports in China, which are an hour and a half train 
ride away from Hong Kong. It used to be a small fisher village, but exceeded 
Hong Kong in TEU throughput in 2013. The growth was triggered by a free 
trade zone and extensive port development (OECD 2013B: 9). Today, the 
ports of Shenzhen are much cheaper for the ship companies to use, largely due 
to the low labour cost. But as Silver would predict, when capital moves, labour 
unrest moves with it. A, respectively, two-day and ten-day strike in two of the 
Shenzhen ports thus came in wake of the 40-day strike in Hong Kong. The 
China Labour Bulletin writes: 
 
The local government quickly intervened and brokered a deal in which workers 
got an extra 600 yuan to 700 yuan per month in benefits and subsidies. Their 
basic wage however remained the same. Although the workers agreed to end the 
strike, several dockers told CLB that they did not see it as a victory (CLB.org.hk 
2013). 
 
This partly illustrates the willingness by the Chinese government to quickly 
act and end the labour unrest, but it might also preempt more labour unrest to 
come. 
Now, the big question is: what strategy shall the labour movement in 
general, and ITF in particular, apply? This question can be answered by 
understanding the nature of the development and changes in the global 
economy. We have established that the fixes and changes affect geographically 
uneven, therefore it will affect workers unevenly – across trade, skill level 
and geographical location. This problem is something that trade unions at all 
times have been aware of, henceforth the many attempts by the labour 
movements to overcome divisions by institutionalising unity. Most often it has 
been done by merging unions and/or building networks and campaigns with 
an emphasis on internationalism. Silver (2003: 9) states that if the realm of 
politics is supranational then labour must be so as well. Here we have seen 
some fairly inspiring lessons from the dockers and seafarers. 
For the GUFs, when wanting to build a global strategy, it makes a lot of 
sense signing international agreements with the employers. However, the 
work of the GUFs, e.g. international agreements, will bear no fruit if they are 
not in close alliance with strong local partners. Often this would be the 
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national union, which would enforce such an agreement. The national union 
can in turn be empowered by the agreement made by the GUF. In such a 
manner the GUFs and national unions can aid each other. Maybe ITF can play 
a crucial role in promoting global strategies and foster the international 
solidarity. Nonetheless, as Paula Hamilton, an academic working for ITF, 
proclaims: 
 
You can’t say ‘a global strategy is going to work’. […] A global strategy is 
interesting for us […], but it is probably not interesting for the crane operator who 
has to go to work and do 60 hour week shifts – you know. […] They are interested 
in reducing their working hours and having better pay. But they are part ... They 
have a role to play in making a global strategy work. If they want to (Hamilton 
2014).  
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7. Conclusion 
The conclusion will present the overall findings of the analysis of 
dockworkers’ associational and structural bargaining power, respectively, and 
build on these findings by concluding on the discussion. 
 
While global trade has evolved and prompted geographical dispersion and 
increasingly complex GVCs, containerisation has at the same time made the 
sea the far preferred way of transporting goods. So while containerisation has 
meant that the same amount of cargo needs less dockworkers, rising maritime 
shipping has at the same time meant that more dockworkers are still hired. 
Ironically enough this rise in maritime trade has in large part been due to the 
containerisation. Meanwhile, the dockworkers have become increasingly 
important as bottlenecks with both backward and forward linkages in the 
many GVCs and thus increasingly important for global trade as a whole. 
Whether this development has heightened the overall structural bargaining 
power of dockworkers is, however, hard to say. The generally low skill level of 
dockworkers and their possibly decreasing scarcity as a consequence of the 
heightened container/man ratio weaken their marketplace bargaining power. 
On the other hand, the increasing skill-level of employed dockers together 
with the growing global trade and the increasing importance of dockworkers 
increase both the marketplace and workplace bargaining power, respectively. 
The latest trends within global trade and maritime shipping thus bring 
multifaceted consequences for the dockworkers. 
Therefore, the overall bargaining power cannot be seen from the side of 
structural power only. The organisation of dockworkers plays a pivotal role in 
wielding the advantages and mitigating the disadvantages that the 
dockworkers’ position in the economic system brings them. 
The analysis of the dockworkers’ associational bargaining power found that 
the unique internationality of the trade of dockworkers has made ITF a 
relatively strong GUF. This, in turn, has meant a great institutional 
associational bargaining power of dockworkers. Meanwhile, the great 
solidarity amongst dockers and seafarers further illustrates the extended 
associational bargaining power of dockworkers. 
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The relatively high international organisation of dockworkers has most 
likely helped them reaping the pros and diminishing the cons that the trends 
of maritime shipping have brought them. This is further a good illustration of 
the great grey area that exists between the concepts of structural and 
associational bargaining power, stressing that the theoretical division is more 
for the purpose of analysing than a mirroring of the reality. 
In the discussion we proposed how further research can be done by 
drawing on the insights gained by this project. Research that can aid unions in 
building an effective global strategy. But as Paula Hamilton reminds us, 
research is nothing, if it does not change the everyday life of ordinary people. 
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Appendix A: Interview w/ Paula 
Hamilton 
K. = Kristian Bruun Andersen, F. = Frederik Buhl Kristensen, P. = Paula 
Hamilton 
 
Chatter about the project work and the semester. 
 
K. How would you describe the organisation of the dockers? 
P. Okay, so let's start with me. I am Paula Hamilton and I am the assistant 
secretary of the dockers' section and most of my work is based on, what we 
call ports of convenience work program. So I do an awful lot of very intensive 
work with - not all our affiliates, but affiliates that we want to work with 
around certain themes within programs. So rather than the broad brush, all 
the political work, I focus a lot on delivering some of the things that need to be 
implemented in the section. So that is kind of what I do. 
So back to your question, now that I have completely side tracked. 
K. So basically the dockers, if you were to say a few general words on how they 
organise and how you organise them.  
P. Okay, so we don't organise them. That's the first thing... 
K. You organise the national affiliates? 
P. So we have at the moment 221 affiliates. In over I think 100 countries; I can 
get you the exact numbers of countries after the interview. The majority of 
those unions are dockers unions; they are not part of general unions. Which 
is... But we do have some quite large affiliates that are part of general unions, 
or big transport unions in their own countries. Within the international 
movement of dockers that is the ITF dockers' section, but there is also the 
IDC, which is a very different kind of organisation. And how we organise 
them, you know, we have the formal things like the committee, the conference 
that we have every four years, and then we have a conference at congress, so 
that is the formal constitutional side of it, where they come together, they 
discuss the issues that they want to discuss and then formulate a work plan 
that they want to work together on. On a day to day level, it's... we try to 
implement that work program in agreement with the section leadership. And 
we tent liate quite intensively with the members of our dockers committee. So 
affiliates engage more with the section than others, which is normal. Is that 
enough? 
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K. Yeah, it was just to get into... 
P. The other thing that we started today, which might be interesting for you, is 
that we've started to map countries that are very important in terms of the 
port sector. And to look at whether we have unions affiliated with those 
countries or if there are unions that need to affiliate, and haven't yet affiliated 
to the ITF Dockers Section. And we will be working on that over the next 
congress period.  
F. And that's something you just started? 
P. Yes, surprisingly. Before it's been very much... it has not been as structured 
in the past and a lot of the time we leave it for regional offices to engage with 
the affiliation-processes, but now it is becoming much more coordinated 
centrally. And that is why we started this mapping process. So we are looking 
very closely at where we need to have our affiliation and where there is 
affiliation, but there might be other dockers' unions that need to come into the 
family. That sort of things. 
K. This mapping process is very interesting to us, and we also had like a whole 
series of questions regarding the regions, because... So you said 'where you 
need to'. What countries you think you would need to organise in? What are 
the big gaps? 
P. Well - it is not so much where there are gaps; it's more where the industry is 
interested in investing more. So for instance there are certain countries, 
certain locations that are very important within the maritime trade network. 
Therefore is it very important that the union - that labour is organised there as 
well. So really are we doing an analysis of where the industry is going? Not 
only in the container section, but also in dry-bulk and in oil, gas and products 
associated. So the full broad spectre of the industry. And really, what we are 
doing is called a 'gap analysis', you know: Where the industry wants to go? 
Where are labours organised? Where we need to encourage it and with what 
unions we to build stronger dockers' unions. 
K. I would like into the mapping process and what industries are the 
important industries, but [for now] we'll just try to find out about your 
organisation. What would you describe as your strengths and what would you 
describe as you weaknesses as an organisation?  
P. Well I think that as a whole we have good representation across most of the 
world. And in the transport sector you have quite a lot of fragmentation in 
terms of unions and that is a challenge - I think - for all global union 
federations, not just ours. So I do think one of our strengths is that we are very 
cohesive and coordinated across the whole of the maritime sector. So there is 
good coordination between seafarers, dockers' unions and inland navigation 
unions. And really that centres and that focus is on the Flags and Convenience 
Campaign, which does help coordinate more effectively in the maritime 
sector. Then other global union federations, they don't have that kind of 
structure and they haven't had that kind of campaign for such a long time [as 
we had]. So I think in that sense that people know and are more familiar with 
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each other within the ITF's structures than they might be other global union 
federations.  
K. And if you were to compare the different sectors that you organise. Like 
compare the dockers to the seafarers. Can you say there is a big difference in 
how well they are organised, how successful? 
P. Yes, but I can... hpmf (clears her throat)... I think when you look at road 
transport, because of the nature of the industry, it's a lot less... there is a lot 
less structure within road transport unions globally. It is much more 
fragmented. Dockers' unions have always had that historic tight-knit, kind of 
'family bond' - you know - that real connection of being "dockers". And they 
have that really strong association of being 'a docker' no matter where they are 
around the world. And that is really one of the strengths of our section. 
Seafarers: extremely complicated to organise seafarers, and I think Fab. will 
probably talk a lot more about that with you. Aviation is well organised, but is 
under immense challenges because of low-cost airlines and the emergence of 
particularly of airlines coming out of the Arab World. But where they are 
organised they are very well organised. (...)wise, historically because they've 
been publicly owned in most countries, there still relatively well organised, 
although facing a great deal of challenges because of privatisation. Tourism 
isn't really one of our strengths, but we have a small tourist section. Aaaand, 
who is I missing... Inland navigation similar challenges that they have with 
seafarers. And fisheries, there are millions and millions of fishers that around 
the world and if you have a change I would suggest that you interview 
someone from the fishery sector because it is very interesting. 
K. You mentioned - I know it is not the area - but you said that 'the nature' of 
the road... like the nature of the work they do, what do you mean by 'nature'? 
P. Well, in terms... well, you got drivers who transit cross-borders unregularly 
and you also have a lot of owner-operators and you have a lot of very small 
companies, and you have a lot of companies that are companies, but they sub-
contract. So it is a very complicated part of the industry and it is very hard to 
regulate that industry internationally. And on top of all that you have - you 
know - coordination and organisation across logistics companies, which is 
very complicated for unions to get their heads around. Don't pick that in the 
quote, hehe. No, that massive reorganisation of the whole freight logistics is 
really one of the biggest challenges that unions in the transport sector is 
facing, because it not only challenges their internal structures, it brings other 
unions into the sector who are organising from other industries because of 
subcontracting and contracting arts(?) of transport within those sectors, so it 
is extremely complicated figuring out how you respond to that.  
K. And how is that... What is the change that you see? So now we're going 
down more in the trends-questions. 
P. So trends in the port-sector or trends in the transport?  
K. In transport in general first. On freights. 
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P. Well, I think that you see quite an aggressive agenda to liberalise rail 
freights in most countries. And that seems as the first way of liberalising the 
whole of the railway sector in most countries. You start with freight. You have 
massive companies like DealTrail, you have big companies like UPS, Shankar, 
these are all companies with a huge global reach and very active in different 
parts of the logistics chain. And so I think the emergence of the over the last 
twenty years has really changed, and is really changing, the chip(?) of the 
industry. You have a lot more subcontracting and precarious work than you 
had in the past. The informal sector is growing. You see a concentration of 
multi-nations acting in our sector, in all parts of our industry.  
K. And those multinationals how would you... like... have you seen... are they 
just getting bigger and bigger or is there more nuances to it... is it within... 
okay, if you just develop on that answer is it within the last five to ten years or 
is it... 
P. Well, I would say it is over the last twenty years, but it has accelerated over 
the last ten years. 
Pause 
P. But underneath that... you know, that's kind of the umbrella of the industry, 
but underneath that is a whole new pattern of subcontracting and 
subcontracted labour. So on the surface it is very concentrated, but actually 
what happens whenever you dig deeper is very much... you know, the new 
paradigm of subcontracted labour is endemic across our industry. 
K. And this endemic trend is it, was it over the last ten years that has escalated 
or? 
P. I can't say that, I've only worked here... *laughter*. I would say, from my 
own personal observations: yes. But could not. I haven't done a historical 
analysis of the situation beyond the last ten years.  
K. And is this, this trend with multinationals getting bigger and the 
subcontracting below that surface. Is that one of the main trends or are there 
other trends that are complimenting or complicating that? 
P. I think you have that, and then on the other side you have or we had a push 
for - in our sector - a port reform maybe twenty or fifteen years ago, you can 
see that the push is coming for that last part of our sector that is in public 
hands. There is a new push to really finally implement port reforms where it 
hasn't been possible in the past. 
K. And when you say 'port reform' do you mean privatisation? 
P. I mean liberalisation right through to privatisation. Normally they start 
with liberalisation and then go to full privatisation eventually.  
K. And then has mainly happened here in Europe or across the globe? 
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P. No! It is across the globe. It is quite clear, whenever you look at industry 
presentations it is very focused on what's left in terms of public sector. Where 
they can push the boundaries of private interest in the sector. You can see that 
there is a resurgence coming again. You got that and then you have all the 
liberalisation issues that have re-emerge within the European Union and you 
can see in Scandinavian countries there is at the moment a concerted effort to 
again liberalise, but where have for instance signed up to the ILO Convention 
on dock work you can see over the last - probably - twelve months a real push 
to suspend or abolish the laws where they have ratified the convention. So it is 
very interesting what is going on in terms of... you know, you have that whole 
political institutional kind of push in sector at the same time as you have this 
real corporate, corporatisation of whole sector now.  
K. And this push in the EU and the full liberalisation, and the Scandinavian 
countries you mentioned, how is that playing out? 
P. You see, the problem is typical, you see the partnering of companies with 
politicians, it is the right environment politically to push this agenda and they 
are doing it. In the political landscape and the corporate landscape the 
dynamics are right and they feel that labour is on the back foot so time whilst 
they think it's the right time. And they are closely watching what the European 
Commission's pushing as well. That convergence of pressure on organised 
labour is really the winner of the moment. 
K. And you say 'labour is on the back foot'...  
P. Well, I would never say that publicly, but we are under more pressure than 
in the past.  
K. So labour is under pressure from these different trends and how... What 
strategies do you apply to counter that? 
P. On that front, I would suggest that you interview Livia. And Livia is the 
ETF's secretary for the port sector, who is leading on this work. She will really 
be able to talk to you much more in depth on that. We support the ETF, but 
the ETF is leading on it. So I think in terms of getting in that (..) she is the 
person to ask the questions to. 
K. Well, all these trends seems not really good for organised labour. But are 
there... Do you see any advantages in the changes? Like, is there any leverage, 
any special leverage points that you have? 
P. My personal view is that what happens is that these pressures are forcing 
unions to rethink how they approach industrial relations and how they 
organise themselves. And I think at the same time, because there is a 
concentration particularly in the container port sector of big companies that 
control quite a lot of the terminals, it creates new opportunities to organise in 
a different way. To build with stronger ties in terms of international solidarity 
and to look at how you can raise minimum standards across the companies, 
which therefore have repercussions in terms of raising standards in the region 
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and globally. It's quite a sophisticated way of thinking about it and that is 
certainly the focus a lot of the work that I do. So, for instance, we got four 
networks established in the four biggest global network terminal operators, 
which are Hutchison, PSA, APM Terminals and DP World. So if are able... 
what our affiliates are working with together and the secretary is supporting is 
figuring out how they are going about raising standards in all the terminals 
where there is organised labour, supporting unions who wants to organise 
whether it is in the union, in the terminals, supporting each other with their 
bargaining, and that is really the stage they are at in the moment. And then 
having a dialog with the head offices of these companies. And that is kind of 
the strategy we are pushing at the moment. So it is a mixture of supporting 
organising on the ground where there is no union, working with affiliates to 
network and share their bargaining experiences, looking at where they can 
benchmark on core issues that are affecting all of them and then working, 
coming together and figuring out how they are going to move forward on that 
agenda. And that is really where we are with that. So, by working with unions 
active within those four companies you are actually having quite a - and if you 
are successful - major influence on the container terminal industry globally. 
And that is really the focus of quite a lot of the work that we do. At the same 
time, the other challenge I haven't mentioned is the automation and new 
technologies [that] will have massive implications for our sector. As it 
becomes the norm in the same way as containerisation transformed our 
industry, automation and new technologies will transform our industry again. 
And that is another area focus that is led by the sector secretary, and working 
with our unions who on different levels, so those unions are facing semi or full 
automation in terminals. There is a very intensive piece of work that we are 
doing and for other unions it is a case of... it is more of an education focus to 
say that these are the types of technologies that will come eventually across 
the industry and let us work to prepare for that coming. So to anticipate what 
is coming rather than being reactive after it comes. So that is another big 
challenge in our industry and we really... Last year we had our automation 
conference where we brought unions together for the first time to really focus 
on what our policy is going to be on this. What do we need to do as unions 
together? How support each other? And so, out of that a whole work program 
has developed that we are now implementing. And now I have lost my train-
of-thought on what we were doing. So yes, GNT is a very big focus. Other 
areas of work, which comes under the "Ports of Convenience" work are 
looking at port reform, and working with unions who are likely to face port 
reforms, so we've mapped where unions are going to be vulnerable to port 
reform. And our regional teams and sections are working with them to start 
prepare them in terms of where they want to respond at. 
K. This mapping is that available or not? 
P. I will have to check. 
K. Okay. We can follow up on that. 
P. So it is a lot of, kind of... at the moment it is really a lot of analysis on what 
the industry is doing, what projections over the next five to ten years in terms 
of what is going to happen, working with unions/affiliates in different ways, 
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and depending of what the core challenges are that they are going to be facing. 
Obviously, the level intensity of work with unions varies a great deal. So some 
unions are quite happy just to affiliate, that is all they want to do, other unions 
really value and want to work very intensively with the secretariat and other 
affiliates.  
K. Is there any overall... Can you say, 'these regions really want to work' or can 
you see any pattern in what... 
P. Well, I haven't really sat down and thought about that very much. I would 
say our Arab World region is very active. The dockers' unions in the Arab 
World have made immense progress over the last ten years. 
K. Do you think that has to do with the development with the trade in general, 
that more trade is going through there or is it more on the organisational side 
that they [improved]? 
P. I think it's more... It is a lot to do with the organisational side, political 
awareness of union leaders having a really good regional team there how work 
really well with their affiliates. So we have had extremely good organising 
successes in the Arab World in terms of the port sector over the last ten years. 
Plus unions who has become affiliated to ITF as well, and that is a region 
where you can really see a great deal of strength in terms of dockers' unions. 
K. And going on to other regions, so North Europe: I guess your headquarter 
is here, you have a big union people like Bob Crowe, former executive 
member... 
P. He is, but actually RMT has a very small organisation of dockers, the union 
for dock workers really in the UK is Unite. But a lot of the works with 
European dockers are done through our Brussels Office, the ETF, and we will 
the support our regional office with more international aspects of the work 
that they are doing. But in Europe dockers are still well organised, but as I 
said before really under pressure from a number of angles at the moment.  
K. And moving more eastwards if we... because some of the big ports, many of 
them in China, but... 
P. Most of them are in China *laughing*. 
K. We looked at some of the affiliate you had and we could see that South 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, we could see that there were affiliates, but it is hard 
to gather whether they're active or... 
P. In Singapore we have our... Our affiliates are in the dockers' section 
committee and work well with him. They are very self-sufficient. In Hong 
Kong we have a number of affiliates that we work quite intensively with. 
Japan is very well organised and they work very well with our Tokyo Office 
that is also linked to languish issues, so it is easier for our Japanese Office to 
work with our Japanese affiliates. Korea we have our Korean affiliate [who] is 
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on our Dockers' Committee and is becoming more active as well. They are I 
would say, reasonable organised. But they have a lot of challenges within 
Korea in terms of organising workers. Taiwan, *sigh* could be better 
*laughing*. And China, I don't know if you keep being monitoring what we are 
doing, but this Monday we signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with the ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions) to take forward a 
work program with them with each of our sections including our dockers 
section. That has still to be approved by our executive board at the end this 
month, but it might be something that you find interesting as part of your 
research.  
K. And why now, because China has been - probably - leading in this sector, 
right? At least the most growing area with bigger and bigger ports. And you 
must have seen the coming, not just now. 
P. Well, the MOU is actually for the whole of ITF, (...) the dockers' section so it 
applies to all the transport sectors, not just the dockers. Obviously we've been 
looking very intensively at China for quite a long time because what it is 
shipping a lot of our sector. Hutchison is headquartered in Hong Kong, 
COSCO is another Chinese company. There are at least eight other Chinese 
companies that are very influential in our sector and several of which have 
already internationalised and the others we anticipate will internationalise in 
the coming years. We have massive investments... Chinese investments in the 
port sector in other regions, so actually engaging with the ACFTU is very 
important. But it is not very straightforward in terms of the politics of it 
[China]. 
K. And I guess the link to the government is that problematic for you? 
P. That is not something I deal with. That gets dealt with by people more 
important than me. 
K. Alright (Paula laughing), we will it to them. I guess it is also maybe a bit of 
a deviation from... 
P. But interesting... 
K. Yeah... But, so... Yeah, I want to go a little bit back to when you mentioned 
that these trends might lead to like, on the positive side, if we were to look 
through h those glasses, give more opportunities of more internationality 
solidarity. This idea of solidarity... 
P. It is a very nice word... 
K. It IS a very nice word, what does it mean to you, you also have - on your 
website - you have a whole tab called ' Solidarity' we could see. So how do you 
use it and what does it mean to you? 
P. Okay, so that varies, depending on a large number of factors. We make it 
for instance, when you look at 'solidarity' on our web pages - there are usually 
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campaigns generated from requests from affiliates for international support. 
The type of solidarity depends on what the issue is that the affiliates are 
confronted with, the degree of urgency of the case. Each factor is different, for 
instance, at the moment we have a campaign to support our union in 
Honduras and solidarity that is developed around that campaign has two 
strains: One is industrial, and the other is political. So a lot of our focus for 
solidarity that is currently be provided by our dockers' unions is very much 
focused on influencing the political situation in Honduras. That takes the form 
of quite traditional things like lobbying, demos outside embassies, lobbying 
different organisations in their country, sending letters to the president of 
Honduras, lots of you know... And then we also have some very active forms of 
practical support that we provide that we won't talk about because it is about 
protecting someone who has been threatened. So it really depends on the 
situation and what response is viable, how much our affiliates want to provide 
support; we can sent out and say 'please support, provide solidarity support' 
but at the end of the day it is up to our affiliate to make the decision, whether 
they are going to engage with that request or not. In the case of Victor 
[Crespo] they are very engage, because - you know - it is a union leader whose 
father died in very suspicious circumstances and it is quite clear that he is 
under treat, so there is a lot of activities are on supporting that union at the 
moment. But it really does vary on the issue and the complexity on what is 
possible, the willingness of affiliates to participate, but one thing that we are 
very focused on in our section is building solidarity beyond letter-writing. 
Which is your kind of traditional backup tactic and we are really starting to 
explore what types of solidarity can involve a more active engagement with 
workers on the ground. And that is something we have been looking at for the 
last, possibly, two months... 
K. And what will... 
P. Well, we are figuring it out at the moment *laughing*. But over the next 
four years I think we will see quite a big shift in our section and amongst our 
affiliates in our section around their approach to solidarity and international 
solidarity.  
K. Can you see any patterns in who is supporting and how much, and it is... 
P. You have some affiliates who will always provide, you know, if you send a 
request they will always do what is requested. And then you have others where 
it really depends: it could be that it is something happening in their region 
and therefore they want to get more engaged, or it is something that they find 
an issue that is really important to them as well so they will engage. So there... 
You can 'crystal ball' a bit and say 'you know, why are they participating', but it 
is usually a combination of: they've always provided international solidarity so 
they always will, they are very acutely aware of the issue and therefore they 
have this bond with the union [in question], it is something that is happening 
in their region and there they know that it's closer to home. So it is a 
combination of those I think. 
K. Which ones is it that are 'always there'? Or is it too many to mention? 
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P. It is probably... I would need to get a list, I need to go back over our last (...) 
of campaigns and go 'okay, these are the ones' that definitely always reply.  
K. In terms of the growing importance of Southeast Asia and China, 
solidarity... Have there been any recent solidarity actions? 
P. Last year we had the Hong Kong Dockers Disputes and I would recommend 
you go and look at the webpages for that. That was a very active solidarity 
campaign.  
K. And successful? 
P. They got an agreement in the end. It wasn't a collective agreement, but the 
contractors involved, they reached an agreement. And we are uniting follow-
up work with our Hong Kong affiliates on a broader campaign that we will be 
running with the ITUC are on bargaining rights in the sector in Hong Kong, 
and that is due to lunch in the summer of this year.  
F. When you say solidarity, is it international solidarity or? 
P. Actually the Hong Kong Dockers Dispute was a very, very active campaign, 
both within Hong Kong and Internationally - it is a really good one to explore 
I think. But very politically complex, because of the different union 
federations and the different unions within Hong Kong, so it is a very 
interesting case study. And there is a lot of footage in YouTube. Things from 
the BBC - it was reported on the BBC and stuff - so you... and I'm sure you will 
find a lot of resource material on that. So for East Asia sure it is an interesting 
(...). *laughing* 
K. So there isn't been, like, that in China? 
P. Well, we don't have an affiliate in China.  
K. So you don't have any way of engaging... At least through the affiliate that 
you have [elsewhere]. 
P. We... I think now that the MOU is in place it will... We will have a much 
closer ability to look at what is going on in the Chinese ports. At the moment 
we are very reliant on second hand information rather than face-to-face, 
concrete information. 
K. Obviously, solidarity is important for the labour movement in general, has 
been crucial. But we are curious to see whether there are particular 
characteristics with the work the dockers do, that they give a special kind of 
solidarity or that... Because you mentioned that the dockers always have had a 
strong identity of being dockers no matter where they were. So does play out 
in the kind of solidarity... In other words, can you see if you compare yourself 
to other global federations or other sectors, can you see 'actually we got 
something special going on here' or would you say.... 
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P. I would say, there are distinctive elements to the type of solidarity dockers 
unions provide, but I am not going to talk on tape about it. Because I can't. 
But there is... There is a very... You know, if a docker dies on a terminal, if that 
is communicated amongst our affiliates everyone feels it. If something specific 
happens, for instance, there was a solidarity campaign quite a number of years 
ago, maybe six years ago, where a union was trying to organise dock workers 
in India and they were, the union leaders, were taken to a quarry and beat up, 
and that actually really stimulated our dockers' unions to support that union - 
to get a collective agreement in that port. So there are definitely emotional 
links. But also a very practical kind of... well they work, they are a docker and 
we know what it is like to be a docker and there is that kind of association 
because it is such a distinct type of work. And it is a very dangerous job a lot of 
the time. And dockers' unions are generally quite politically aware and there is 
usually good member education, so I think there are certain elements that 
makes it distinctive. But I think every section will say that *laughing*.  
F. Are they aware of the very, very important position in the whole 
machinery? 
P. Oh, yes! Oh, yes. There is also that factor yes. They are a choke point, which 
is why there is so much pressure on organised labour in the dockers, in the 
ports. Because they are, we are, seen as the Neanderthals now. As the problem 
rather than the solution. And actually, you know, our unions are actually a lot 
of the time extremely progressive in terms of working with the industry to find 
solutions to things. But it is how we are portrayed [like Neanderthals]. 
F. So do you find it harder to organise because of that position? 
P. I think there is a lot of union avoidance and a lot of effort put into keeping 
unions out of ports. 
F. Because they know you have a great power as soon as you get in? 
P. I would say it is potential power.  
K. How would you describe this potential power? 
P. Well I think we all know how the maritime network works and how logistics 
and supply chains work, so it got to move and it got to go through a port at 
some stage - no matter what it is. So it is a vulnerability within every supply 
chain dependent on maritime shipping.  
K. And this position as having a 'checkpoint' how does that play out in 
concrete solidarity actions? Do you organise global strikes together? 
P. I think a global strike... Well... That is a very nice idea, but it is not legally 
possible. Because no matter how globalised global economy is national laws 
will always have an important role and there are very different laws about 
what is illegal actions in every country. Therefore unions are unions and there 
is a secretariat we have a responsibility to ensure that actions are within the 
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law of that country. Whilst it is a very nice grand idea it is not something that 
can be applied. And that is one of the dynamics of today's world; you've got 
very different political landscapes to the economic landscapes. 
K. These different political landscapes do you experience a difference when, 
yes - there might be the national law, but some or a lot of ports are located in 
export processing zones, which is... 
P. No, export processing zones tend to be attached to ports, to ports within 
exporting zones. 
K. So they are usually... ports are usually actually within the national 
jurisdiction? 
P. Yeah. But then you have countries such as the United Arab Emirates were 
there are no laws on trading union rights and they have one of the biggest port 
operations in the world.  
K. I think we manage to touch upon most of the questions really... 
P. I have got a couple of industry things that you might find interesting on 
trends in the sector and recent things that are happening. So, you know, 
obviously the port industry will be affected by the emergence of the P3 
Alliance because terminal choice will be quite a complex decision over the 
coming years. That consolidation within the shipping sector will have a knock-
on effect in terms of what will happen in the port sector. And also you have 
shipping lines that are parts of companies that also have port and port 
operator divisions so it is quite a complex and inter-weaved sector, the 
maritime sector. And the other thing that will have an effect, obviously, in 
terms of ports and therefore organised labour is the vary VLCC's [ships] that 
are coming on the street - so these are massive container ships [that] will 
shape or reshape the maritime network in terms of ports. So some ports will 
be able to capture that business, other ports won't and therefore you will see a 
reordering of port happening. And again, that will has applications about 
organised labour, what kind of pressure there will be put on unions in 
different countries because of that dynamic as well.  
USE GVC theory here to explain what implications the changes in the industry 
might have. 
K. And when this reshaping takes place and there is... 
P. Well, it is taking place... 
K. Well, these changes putting pressure on different unions, sometimes you 
would see that workers in different countries are, or seems to be in direct 
competition over the same jobs... 
P. Ports are always in competition and terminals are in competition within 
ports, so... 
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K. So this competition between the workers, how... Is that something you 
experience a lot? Is that something that is a recurrent issue or is the solidarity 
so strong that that is not really a question? 
P. Well, that is a very interesting psychological question *laughing*.  
K. Obviously, you see it from a very top-down so... 
P. Well, we... Yeah, it is quite interesting, you know... You kind of the global, 
so you're quite distanced from what is happening on the ground a lot of the 
time. Unless you're actually in a port talking to workers, which we like to do 
quite a lot in our section. But, you know, competition is kind of like: it's there, 
everybody knows it's there, everybody know that their ports are competing 
with the ports next door. It is very intensive in some parts regions, it is less 
intensive in other regions. So ports in Africa, you know, there are a couple of 
ports that have always competed with each other. But it is also to do with 
infrastructure investments, on which ports can compete with each other. In 
Europe it is very intensive; our unions have dealt with competition between 
themselves for well over a century. And it is just a fact of life. But it is used by 
companies and governments to pitch try to pitch unions and workers against 
each other’s. And sometimes we are almost enemies *laughing*. 
K. So you had some successes in... at Hong Kong, organising or helping 
them... 
P. Well, I think there was a resolution to the dispute, so yes, I would say that 
was a success. But we don't have a full-blown collected agreement with 
Hutchinson in Hong Kong so there are still things that need to do. 
K. Yeah, I know, I would say... You know, ask to... some of the successes and 
failures that you've face within recent times. 
P. I think the most influential success that dockers' unions have had has 
certainly been defeat of 'Port Package 1' and 'Port Package 2' in Europe, and 
they are effective - you know - and they are working together in Europe now to 
combat what is 'Port Package 3' but it is a very loose... it is not shaped the 
same way as Port Package 1 & 2. I do suggest that you talk to Livia because you 
will find that really interesting what is going on. So I think those are probably 
very influential successes, I think the West Coast lockout was a very 
significant point in the history of the dockers’ movement. The recent 
compliment of the ILA agreement, very influential because they were actually 
able to negotiate automation clauses, which secures jobs for the future of the 
longshoremen on the east coast. I think there are many successes, I think the 
problem is that we don't really publicise them or celebrate them that we have 
successes. And I think, this week we had a very important success after a very 
long time, which was that in the Netherlands our Dutch union was able to 
secure the pension funds that were stolen for them *whisper* after a seven 
year campaign. So sometime the success gets lost in the length of time it takes 
to get the success. So - you know - those are things... And you can see those, 
there are things in our archives and there are things on our website, which 
show success it is just, it is easier for people shout about failures that to shout 
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about what’s been a win. Or even to recognise that something has been 
success sometimes.  
K. As in the case with Hong Kong? You never get exactly what you wanted, you 
always get some of it and there is always more fight for. 
P. So there have been some very significant successes I would say over the last 
fifteen years amongst dockers' unions. And there have been smaller successes 
which are very important. You know, they set precedents for the future. And 
the Agone(?) one which was in the Netherlands is an important one. It is like 
'we are not going away; we want our pension money back, give it back to us!' 
And they got it back. You know, they got a settlement with a very powerful 
company. Not a port company, but a rather large financial company. 
K. If you think... So there are (...) trends going on the global level where the 
multinationals are getting bigger, (...) more and more subcontracting, some of 
your successes are like the ILO agreement, which I guess is on the global side 
you could say... 
P. Well, I think you should ask Fab. a bit more about maritime labour 
convention, because that is a really significant success for labour as a whole, 
but particularly for seafarers and the ILO conventions that relate to dock 
workers are really old and not very many countries have ratified them. But we 
have quite an active dialog within the ILO so we are part of the group of 
experts who will rewrite the code of practice on health and safety in ports, so 
we do have a very active role within the ILO as a section. But not to the extent 
seafarers have, but the seafarers are very exceptional in terms of their inputs 
into institutions. They are very active in the IMO, we engage with the IMO 
when it is issue that are important to dockers. So particularly the movement 
container safety is something that we are very actively campaigning on. Both 
institutionally, politically and through other areas of our work as well.   
K. How come - or maybe we should ask Fab. about the seafarers, why they 
have such a big input into the ILO. But I was curious to... If you were to 
choose some victories like how... What you would like to see happening? 
Whether that would be on the more global scale or if you would rather... I'm 
putting up a false dichotomy here. 
P. I can see that already *laughing*. 
K. But where you would rather win some victories on - you know - more 
locally, like... 
P. I think you have to go back to - you know - who are unions made up of? And 
they are not made up of people like me; they are made up of workers. So really 
the successes are what they judge as successes. So they are... For dockers on 
the ground local successes are always going to be more important. For union 
leaders local and national successes... and international successes are all 
balanced. And I think - really - that it depends what lens you want to look 
through.  
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K. In terms of like... 
P. I think it has to be a convergence of local, national and international 
strategy that is going to work. Because not all of them will work, but if enough 
of them work then you will see a shift in the sector. 
K. And you can't point to - like - basically what will... basically best counter or 
engage with the trends coming [be]... You know, these things are coming how 
can we. 
P. Well I don't think we can have carte blanche approach and our section 
doesn't take a carte blanche approach to things. So we will, as I said earlier, we 
work intensively with some unions because success for those unions has 
success beyond their borders. We work with groups of unions because their 
success (...) part of the industry internationally and globally. And we work 
within - you know - as a section of unions we work with engaging for instance 
with institutions, with setting policy, implementing policy. So really it is a 
web. It is not... You can't say 'a global strategy is going to work' because a 
global strategy... A global strategy is interesting for those of us who are 
interested in in, but it is probably not interesting for the crane operator who 
has to go to work and do 60 hour week shifts - you know. That is probably not 
anything they are going to be interested in. They are going to be interested in 
reducing their working hours, and having better pay. But they are part... They 
have a role to play in making a global strategy work. If they want to.  
K. Okay. Thank you so much. You mentioned some of those unions that are 
active. And is that what we are going to follow up on, who’s... 
P. So okay, so I would start, if I was you and you want to do more dockers 
interviews, if you have enough time. I would interview Livia in your Brussels 
office... Can we turn that on and off? 
K. Yeah... 
FINISH 
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Appendix B: Interview w/ Fabrizio 
Barcelona 
K. = Kristian Bruun Andersen, F. = Fabrizio Barcelona 
 
 
K. [Explaining about Roskilde University]: We are focusing on trade, the 
international trends in trade and how that effects the ability for workers to 
organise. So we are curios... basically we are interested in changes oin 
company structures, business models, value chains, production networks and 
you deal with that and what effects it has on you as a global union. So, 
yesterday ew talked to Paula about the dockers, obviously you work with 
seafarers, so if you can give us  few headlines on how you work with seafarers, 
how you organisae and what your strengths and weaknesses are? 
 
F. The organisation of seafarers are made by our affiliates that are.... 
 
K. How many? 
 
F. We have over 250.And the organise around 800,000 seafarers, which is 
roughly half of the total workforce, which around 1.5 - 1.6 million. Our 
strengths is that we manage to secure a collective global bargaining agreement 
that covers most of the seafarers that have not... were not covered by national 
legislation. That means we cover 11,000 FOC (Flag of convenience) we an 
average of 15 crew on it that are international. So the benefit from an 
agreement that take into consideration the minimum international standard 
by the ILO. And we have on top of that build a series of conditions that make 
this agreement quite important for most of seafarers working (...).  
 
The weaknesses is that it is a global industry and although the assistance of 
150-140 ITF inspectors. They support world wide. You can say, they are the 
front eyes in the ports and they managed to assist the seafarers in the ports 
and inform the about the ITF conditions and all the changes in the industry. It 
is not always easy to meet with seafarers. There has been in the past few years 
few rules applied in the ports that limits the access to the ships by ITF 
inspectors. Some of the seafarers not necessarily have a relation to the 
affiliates in their country. So I think that...  I would say we face the same 
problem of many other trade unions that workers not necessarily see the need 
to join a trade union until the time they end up in trouble.This is especially in 
the younger generation. I guess, it is probably because the society tell you you 
can do... give you a lot of input of messages that suggest how good you can be 
as an individual that you don't think that sometime you the assistance of 
others or be together with others to make sure that rights and standards are 
kept at a certain level.  
 
K. This thing about the younger generation that don't take part of the national 
union: Do you see any patterns were there are certain areas, where that is 
taking place, and others where you actually do managed to organise. Are there 
any overall patterns to that? 
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F. I would say that because of the lost of the seafarers profession in the 
Western part of the world to the advantage of the Eastern part and the South 
part of the globe. I think we have lost a generation or a couple of generations 
of people who join the ship when they were younger and that we didn't have 
access to them, so they have grown up with the idea that there was no 
necessity to be part of a TU. As ITF we have established the department of the 
youth transport workers to make sure that we reach out to younger seafarers 
in our case - and dockers they have a youth department as well  to make sure 
that what are their concerns are channelled into the discussion of the ITF 
body that decide policy so that there is an understanding of the problems they 
face.  
 
K. We can see that solidarity have a tab on its own on your website with 
messages of solidarity from affiliates to affiliates. For the seafarers what does 
this concept of solidarity mean? Because it has been a big one for the labour 
movement, but what does it actually mean? 
 
F. There are two: One is the solidarity between the dockers and the seafarers. 
That is probably more difficult to be understood. It is true that the dockers 
and the seafarers meet when the ships call into the port, but the cultural and 
nationality difference are quite big. So just brief encounters with the others 
makes it difficult to make them understanding, you know, as a seafarers you 
shouldn't be doing certain work that traditionally has been done by the 
dockers. Vice versa, if the dockers see appalling conditions on the ship maybe 
they can do something to assist them. In that case solidarity is that tangible. 
Not moving the cargo the of the ship because the crew is not paid, they don't 
water, they don't have food. So, if the want they cargo, they have to address 
the problem of the crew. That is  kind of solidarity. Vice versa if the seafarers 
instead of unlashing (?) the containers before arriving in the port... don't do 
that... then the dockers can benefit from that kind of solidarity, because they 
will be paid to that job that traditionally been done by the dockers.  
 
And solidarity in a different situation when seafarers from a company are 
victimised or are marginalised. And as a result we have the solidarity from the 
unions around the world. That is less tangible, but still have the political 
weight (?) to send a letter of protest to an embassy, to talk to other companies 
that deal with that particular operator. So there are different forms of 
solidarity that are limited to simply send a letter of protest to make sure 
someone receive a complaint. 
 
K. This first kind of solidarity between dockers and seafarers, has there been 
any successful or less successful examples in recent times, where you can 
actually in this case it made... these dynamics changed, because of this. 
 
F. I remember in the past there has been a big in a big terminal in Australia. 
The dockers there were lock outed, because they wanted to change completely 
the terms and conditions of their employment agreement. They wanted to 
employ people at different rates, and lose all the benefits that the dockers have 
acquired. So there has been a strong campaign that involved seafarers in a 
very simple way. They were asked to attached some stickers on the containers 
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they transported. That was a way for the seafarers to demonstrate that they 
support the dockers. And there have been a lock out and a big rally in the 
particular port. In the end, after a dispute of 6 months the government... they 
managed to get what they wanted. I mean, sit at the table and discuss the 
changes, rather than the changes being imposed.  
 
K. When and where was this? 
 
F. It was in 2007. In Australia. It was a quite big dispute of the time. An other 
one, was about piracy. It was mainly seafarers. We managed to collect about 1 
million signatures that was delivered to the ILO here in London. To draw the 
attention of the government of the growing problem of piracy. Before that no-
one was not really paying attention to that. That was the starting point when 
the government started to look at the problem in a different way. For years 
into that time the attacks on ships in Somalia has come to zero. At that point 
there were about 1,000 seafarers that was held hostages in the hands of the 
pirates. And noone was doing anything about it. 
 
K. This was? 
 
F. The campaign started in 2010 and by now 2014 we have zero attacks. There 
are still 50 seafarers out there in the hands of the pirates. We are working to 
get them out of Somalia, but compared to the 1,000.... 
 
K. Yeah, it is a big difference. Do think that the particular work seafarers do is 
giving them a special or unique sense of solidarity. 
 
F. Yeah, I do. 
 
K. And what are the characteristics? And how does that transform into 
stronger bonds of solidarity? 
 
F. That is quite visible, when you have a situation where seafarers are 
abandoned, because the company went bankrupt in the port. And you see 
the... And we are not aware of it (...) it is a port where we have no ITF 
inspectors or no one inform us. So you see other ships that have called in that 
port that have no problem. They definitely support them with food, water, 
information and allow them to call back home. And then report back to us and 
ask us to intervene or make sure they leave something behind in that port for 
the seafarers to be able to contact a lawyer (...) and as a result start a process 
where we can either repatriate them, seize the ship and then sell the ship to 
get the money back to the seafarers. Although they are not necessarily the 
same nationality when they end up in trouble you can see that seafarers tend 
to help others. 
 
K. Do you think that the fact that seafarers they sail across the globe that 
makes a difference in understanding... 
 
F. Yeah, but not only because they travel. It was like that, but until 40 years 
ago on board of an Italian ship you could find Italians only. Now on the same 
ship you can find 2 Italians, 3 Rumanians, 4 Filipinos and 2 Indians. So they 
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have learned by working and living together everyday. They become 
accustomed to different cultural types. Understanding better the differences 
between nationalities and the requirement that someone might have in terms 
of religion, food. So they learn better, so that is on the top of the fact that they 
in the past they visited different port around the globe, but now they really live 
shoulder to shoulder with someone different from their nationality. 
 
K. Let's talk about ITF as a GUF and how your federation might be different or 
unique in compared to other federations. As a union federation how would 
you compare yourself to other GUFs? 
 
F. I might be wrong, but the seafarers industry is the only true global industry 
in the sense that - with exception of aviation that have similar thing - but the 
other GUF have, you know, affiliates coming from all over the globe, but then 
the affiliates in that country not necessarily have any relation with affiliates in 
other countries. The metal workers for example - I'm not sure how that works 
- but they would certainly have affiliates from India and Germany, but the 
affiliates will deal only with the plants based in India and Germany. They 
might have the same owner, but workers are completely separate. Here we are 
talking about affiliates, German affiliates, that work shoulder to shoulder with 
a Filipino and Indonesian, because the German would have a ship, but the 
Filipino and Indonesian are those that man those ships. The same apply fro 
Denmark with Maersk Group. Obviously the company is international, but the 
core is in Denmark. And then you that you would have a least 15 of affiliates 
they all work together, because they all have relation with Maersk. So I think 
that we different in this way. 
 
K. We now that you recently, a month or two ago won the minimum wage for 
lost of FOC ships and thats, as far as we are concerned, quite unique that a 
GUF is making wage agreement directly with an international shipping 
federation. We talked to P yesterday, and she said you know a lot about the ins 
and outs of these collective bargaining forums (CBF). So how does it play out; 
how does it work? 
 
F. As we speak there is a meeting on 4th floor between ITF and IMAC 
(international maritime), and there is a 3F guy up there. That is an evolution. 
The ITF started by imposing agreement on the ship owners that fly there ships 
under FOC vessels. So, what happen? You arrive in a port, you don't have the 
ship covered by an ITF agreement. And an inspector with the solidarity of a 
docker sometimes and the solidarity with other seafarer organisation that put 
pressure on the ship owner and impose an agreement. It was quite expansive 
and was quite close to the national standard applicable to the West. Then, 
through the years we have managed to reach the development of 11,000 of 
these agreements. And then we start to talk with the managers and the ship 
owners on the other side .. to establish a (...) why don't we sit together and 
think about what is globally acceptable that can be applied to the seafarers. 
And that only apply if the ship owners are part of this discussion. For anyone 
else you can  still impose your agreement when you can. It is not automatic 
that you can impose your agreement. So we start this negotiation based on the 
ILO interpretation of minimum wages - that we already discussed with the ISF 
- and we come up with a complete set of wages for all ran on board. An again, 
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it is an agreement that is not only about wages but also about sickness 
compensation and other articles that are already part of our discussion. And 
we managed to finally have in place this global agreement, which is called IBF. 
Applicable to all ship owners that are part of the discussion. 
 
We have bout 6,000 of those agreements today. Negotiated by our affiliates 
and the ship owner of that particular company. And then we have about 4-
5,000 agreements that we still impose on ship owners that don't want to be 
part of that.  
 
K. When you said it was expensive to impose agreements on each vessel... 
 
F. That was a punishment agreement in a sense that you are confronted with a 
situation where a ship was coming into the port and the seafarers was paid 
200-300 US$/month. In the same port you might have another ship that is 
covered by an acceptable agreement, where the same seafarers et a 1,500 US$. 
In a sense we see ourselves as balancing the industry. Because the ship owner 
that pay 300 $ dollars can offer himself to the market at a lower price, than 
someone that abide all the regulations. So we try to do balancing in that sense. 
And I suspect that some big ship owners that are (?) appreciate our effort to 
do that. Just to limit the possibility for those that really don't pay (?), don't 
pay much attention to the safety of the ship and end up with a ship 
abandoned, because they don't have enough funds are kicked out from the 
market. Leaving the market to those that are proper operators. 
 
K. And this punishment agreement would that be imposed ... would that be ... 
would you then push the prices up to, let's say, 1,500 so you would just be 
balancing out, or would it be higher than ... 
 
F. Well, we always try to get it higher, but before we decide, I don't know, next 
year the wages for enabled(?) seafarers from 1,500 it needs to go up to 1,700, 
and then it was up to us to impose that with all the difficulties that entail. Now 
there is a discussion with shipowners on the other side. They say: "No, 1,700 is 
too much, because the rates (...) are too low, the market is not stable", and we 
argument "yes, but the market growing. We need to take into consideration 
the inflation and so forth", so we find a negotiation midway to agree ... on 
things. And I repeat(?) correctly so, we always tend to talk about the wages, 
but it's not only about the wages ... 
 
K. No it's also ... [inaudible] safety ... 
 
F. Yeah, [inaudible] because if you have a look at the work of my colleagues on 
the other side of the building, on many cases the seafarers are injured, they 
lost their profession, they die, so that is very important, because that is part of 
the collective agreement. Otherwise they won't receive anything. 
 
K. Sure. What is the big difference between those imposed ... on vessels not 
being part of the IBF and those who are a part of it? 
 
F. The big difference? 
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K. Between the agreements. So ... 
 
F. The agreement is wages - that definitely is a part of it - and the much less 
flexibility in implementation. Because the ITF agreements are negotiated 
between for example a Polish company, by our Polish affiliates and the Polish 
shipowner association and the Polish company. So there is a three partite 
discussion, where some of the money - a part of the deal - are for example 
directed for training to ensure that all seafarers are all the same in training 
and keep up their possibilities to be employed in the industry at all times. So 
there is more flexibility in the application, I would say. 
 
K. So ... would you say that the agreements that are ... with the vessels that are 
a part of the ITF ... 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. ... they are more flexible or less? 
 
F. More flexible. 
 
K. And would you say that their wages are higher or lower? 
 
F. Eh ... I feel that they are slightly ... are the same of the other agreement, but 
the way you can implement the agreement on IBF vessels is slightly more 
flexible. 
 
K. Yeah. And when they are not part of a vessel [inaudible], is it then the 
national union and the shipowner? 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. It's only those two partners? 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. Or is ITF a part of it in ... 
 
F. No. Sometimes they ... in certain situations when the shipowner asks for 
two much flexibility in the application, then the affiliates can ask the ITF to 
participate in a negotiation: Like why is it the shipowner may ask the 
shipowner association in that country to assist them in a negotiation. 
 
K. Mhm. So, why do you think that ... Okay, as I understand it, the ITF is one 
on the only global federations that actually have these IBFs (International 
Bargaining Forums). 
 
F. Yeah. That is why we are global. 
 
K. And why would you think that is the case? 
 
F. Because ... on short based companies - for example if the contractual terms 
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or conditions are ... the wages are based where the factory plant is ... when you 
are a seafarer it doesn't matter if you are from the Philippines, when you 
spend at least nine to ten months of your life working in places where the 
wages conditions are not ... nowhere near the one in the Philippines. 
 
K. Yeah. 
 
F. So we think that the reason, the possibility to apply certain wages to a large 
number of seafarers coming from different parts of the world. We are aware 
that what we offer in our agreements for the officers for example is not really a 
true reflection of what they get onboard. But nonetheless we set the minimum. 
So anything they can get above that  (...) is better. If you don't set a minimum, 
the temptation for some shipowners will be to pay less than that. 
 
K. Mhm. In ... going on to the more regional aspects of the work that you do ... 
then, are there ... 'cause most of the work, as you say, is done on the ships. 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. So it’s, but is it ... is there still a big difference in how well you are organised 
and in how much people are paid? Can you see like regional differences, or is 
it pretty much harmonised; when on the sea, everyone is the same? 
 
F. But it is not based on a region, but it's based on the ship type. 
 
K. Yeah. 
 
F. So if you work - if you have the luck to work - at an LNG or LPG vessel, you 
can easily make (...) 10 to 15,000 US dollars a month, and the (...) seafarers 
onboard those ships will be 3-4,000 US dollars a month - that by standard in 
any country of the world would mean decent wages. If you work on a bulk 
carrier on a spot that you don't know, if you will have the cargo tomorrow 
maybe, you are paid ... or the attempt of the shipowner is to pay you - I don't 
know - 800 dollars. So the difference is there. But it depends on the ship type, 
because the region ... not really ... because not applicable for ships, because 
the ships will one week be in the Gulf of Guinea loading cargo and then go to 
the United States, or two weeks later will be ... so that does not apply for 
longer(?) ships - it may apply if you are doing (???), that yes. Is that the case, 
then of course there will be differences between certain countries and other ... 
regions. 
 
K. The shift in global trade patterns, and the shifts in what regions the biggest 
ports are located. Have you experienced that - you also mentioned that there 
was a loss of jobs in the west ... 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. ... moving towards the east. How have you experienced that when 
organising? 
 
F. Well before there was the shift of the economic power from West to East, 
 110 
the Eastern seafarers were already the predominant in the industry, so we 
haven't seen that happening. I remember that ten years ago there were the big 
fear that by 2014 or 2013, the vast majority of seafarers would have been 
Chinese. Because, you know, the growing economy. And then we have realised 
that that is not the case, because the educated seafarers - professional 
seafarers - in China find much better opportunity ashore because of the 
booming industry that go in at sea(?). As a result Chinese have to resort(?) to 
seafarers coming from the inland, but are not traditionally seafarers, so they 
have problem with the language, they don't speak English. And so the 
shipowners in the West were not really impressed and they continued to 
employ (from) long established nations like Philippines, Indonesia, India that 
have always been providing seafarers for the past 60 years, and they have a 
tradition, they have maritime education, they are much more reliable. So as of 
today we haven't yet seen massive shifts. Certainly there is a shortage of 
seafarers. More so before the crisis, but still now that the markets are starting 
to go up again, there is a shortage of seafarers, so we might see different 
nationalities becoming seafaring ... seafarer providers that were not there 
before. But we don't think that it will be a massive change. 
 
K. Okay. Have you experienced the shift from West to East in other ways ... it 
did not affect your nationalities of employment, but has it had other effects on 
the work that you do? 
 
F. Nah ... not really, because today ... the ports certainly ... I am sure that the 
ports have seen [inaudible] - ports like Singapore, Hongkong and the Chinese 
ports are growing exponentially, but still it's ... shipping is a trading of goods, 
so if you don't produced anymore in Europe, but you produce in China, then 
the ships will go the other way around; go and get the goods in China and 
deliver to Europe, while 30 years ago it was the other way around; we would 
produce in Europe, and we export somewhere else. But from a shipping point 
of view, there are still trade between the countries regardless of were the 
economic power is. 
 
K. Mhm. And ... so ... with Paula (Hamilton) we talked about some of the big 
trends that they - changes that they see are liberalisation of ports all the way 
to privatisation of ports ... 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. ... it was also the multinationals becoming bigger and bigger and bigger - 
agglomerating - at the same time, underneath, there was a greater and greater 
degree of subcontracting. And that was some of the big challenges that they 
face. Would you say that the same tendencies and trends are affecting you? 
And ... 
 
F. I feel it kind of is related to type of ship and type of cargo. There is a big 
dispute that has been discussed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the regulative body in the EU regarded this alliance between Maersk maritime 
(?) shipping company and CGM and the CMA called the P3 (alliance), because 
being that those three companies are the first three in the market, it seems 
that they tend to ... this is a first step to become like a monopoly. So we are 
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looking with interest on the development. We are working on it to see how 
that can impact on seafarers if it means reduction of services or reduction of 
ships and job availability for seafarers. If that will cause other companies to be 
put out of the market. That will not be positive for the market in itself, because 
you are aware that these companies are the first, second, and third in terms of 
container transport, but half of their fleet is made of a charter vessel that 
meet(?) with other companies that charter their vessels - mainly German for 
Maersk and other nationalities, Greek, Norwegian for MSC and CGM and 
CMA. Wo we need to see how that works, and strangely enough CMA and 
CGM are also part of the so called P7, which is another conference where there 
are Asian companies that harmonise the trade, the (...) to make sure that they 
are not all three or all seven competing on the same ports where the profit will 
be very limited, so they prefer to sell space on their own ship on behalf of their 
own company. That is what it's all about. But again, when I say the type of 
ship and type of trade, because the container vessels until before the crisis 
were the most profitable ships. During the crisis they travel out empty, and 
the problem (before) was overcapacity, so now that the situation i mildly 
improving there are still too many ships and too many containers for the 
traffic of today. So that's why they try to get together and harmonise more 
than becoming predominant in the market. 
 
K. Mhm ... (long pause) Ok, so we have covered some of the trends, like ... do 
you see ... I guess it's not ... The liberalisation and the privatisation, I guess it's 
... all the ships are private, so that's not really an issue for you? 
 
F. No, there are at the national level. I think the last stronghold was, and still 
are in certain countries, the ferries. The national flagged ferries that have 
obligations to serve islands or remote communities. And they might still be 
under government control. Otherwise, yes the maritime market is a free 
market, a private market, it is not, and has not been for a long time now, part 
of the asset of the government or the state. 
 
K. And do you think the changes in the ownership of the ports and how they 
operate - does that effect ... have spillover effects into the shipping...? 
 
F. They have effects in the sense that we are concerned about the safety of the 
seafarers, because of the required time to load or unload the ships has 
decreased over the years. We are concerned because of the numbers of 
seafarers on board have reduced through the years because there is more 
automation put on to the ship. But nonetheless, a ship working at sea, in a 
condition that the sea can be, you need to (...) and have enough people to 
ensure the security on board. The port (...) is changing in the sense that they 
want to have a quicker turnout than ever before. So less people on board and 
more time devoted to the commerce operation. (...) Some seafarers they prefer 
much more to be at sea than to be in ports. It sounds maybe not normal, but 
when they are at sea, the time is more ... follow a normal routine, more 
relaxed. As soon as they arrive in ports they have a visit of the customers, the 
agent, the surveyor, then you start a commerce operation and then 8-9 hours 
later you are kicked out, so it is very stressful. 
 
K. And this quicker turnaround, does that have anything to do with just in 
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time (JIT) production? 
 
F. What do you mean, sorry? 
 
K. JIT production? It's ... the idea is that no goods should be stored in one 
place for a certain amount of time. So the point is, from the shoe factory all the 
way to the shoes shop, the shoe is never in a storage room - it's always on the 
move, being produced, the parts coming together, going to the port, strictly 
going on a ship, almost coming from the factories straight into the ... onto the 
ship, and then ... 
 
F. Yeah, that could be one reason. The other is that there is not enough space 
to keep all the goods in one port, so that's why you need to have the quickest 
possible time from production to distribution. And (...) then it's even worse 
(...). But in reality I still think it's because we tend to consume a lot, so there is 
more turnaround. And as a society we are getting used to that we want to buy 
a telephone, and we want to go to the shop, pay, buy, and take it away. So I 
feel that the flocks of goods need to be kept regular. 
 
K. The automation. 
 
F. Yeah 
 
K. How does that play out and what effects does it have on you and your 
members, and what do you do in order to limit those effects? 
 
F. I don't think that you can limit the automation ... 
 
K. Limit the effects. 
 
F. Yeah. Most of the time it's beneficial, or could be beneficial. The problem is 
that a ship - no matter how modern it is - is a complex structure that not 
necessarily is able to sustain too much automation. You always need 
something - or someone - to check the automation. The risk is that the ship 
owner is led to believe that once you have replaced seafarers with a machine 
that for example communicate - sends messages, receives messages - so we 
have lost for example a radio operator position - they are no longer (onboard, 
important?). Ten years ago each ship had a radio operator, and then the 
problem was resolved. But most of the time they realise that after a few 
months, after less than a year, the automation that they have put in place is 
not working in a satisfactory way. So you have removed one person, and the 
automation hasn't helped. In other situations, the automation probably has 
helped in the way how to make - load and unload - programmer to unload and 
load the ship for example. Tat definitely has helped the people that have to do 
that operation in a more secure, secure way. So depending on what it is, and 
now I don't know if you have seen - recently there was this Rolls-Royce 
concept of a drone ship. A ship being controlled by remote operator, so it has 
no crew onboard or just two or three crew onboard in case of emergency. That, 
I think, is a fantasy approach, and I wouldn't be sure that you want to have 
crude oil 350,000 tons ships sailing around with no crew but move from an 
operator sitting in an office in London for example. That is the extreme. But 
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certainly the automation needs to be accompanied with a thorough thinking of 
whether the benefits are for the overall society, I suppose. 
 
K. Yeah, ok cool. Ehm, so I want to go a little bit back, because there was some 
things you said in the beginning that I wanted to get deeper into. You 
mentioned that ... that you ... some of the weaknesses is that you have limited 
access to some ships. Can you something about, like, what kind of ships is that 
- are they located in particular places, are they in certain industries, or ...? 
 
F. That is another effect of privatisation. Most of the terminals are private. So 
with the exception of the police no one else can access the terminal. When the 
terminals used to be in government hands - when the port was owned by 
government - you as a citizen and worker for the ITF, you could apply - you 
have an issue you can go and ... That was one limitation. The other is - there 
has always been limitations to that, but now it has increased - all the oil 
terminals, they for safety and strategic reasons have very limited access to 
those terminals. 
 
K. The oil ...? 
 
F. Yeah. You really need to have a serious issue to visit a ship there, because ... 
 
K. What's strategic? 
 
F. Because they are seen as a strategic asset of a country. 
 
K. So they are afraid that other nations would send in spies? 
 
F. Yeah, whatever. The security don't allow you there. 
 
K. Okay. 
 
F. And then with the international ISBS code - International (...) Security (...) 
something like that, ISBS. That was introduced after 9/11 in the States. Again, 
you can get access to the ports but you have to inform the authority and the 
agent beforehand that you are going to be in the vessel. So it makes things 
more complicated than it used to be before. Before, access to ports was much 
easier, and you look, as and ITF(?) inspector you look at the ship (...) in the 
morning you choose the ship you are going to visit based on the flag, based on 
the knowledge that you have with particular ships, and then you visit. Today 
it's not that easy unless the seafarers call you with their problems. 
 
K. As a final question, unless you have some (addressing Frederik), I wanted 
to ask if you think, overall - let's say the last 10-15 years, or you can shorten 
the (...), but overall - do you think that the bargaining power of the seafarers 
has increased or decreased? 
 
F. That is ... the past 15 years, it's difficult to answer, because before the crisis, 
there were not enough seafarers and the shipowners tended to offer very rich 
contracts to anyone. During the crisis vice versa, a lot of seafarers lost their 
jobs - no power at all. Now there are certain seafarers that have a good 
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bargaining position - as I mentioned earlier for example if you work at a 
chemical tanker, LPG or LNG, and they need a bit of assistance in their 
bargaining collective agreements on any other types of ships. So (...) in waves. 
I wouldn't say ... 
 
K. Very closely linked to the market? 
 
F. Yeah. Yeah. That's why, as ITF, when we were talking about this IBF 
agreement, I don't necessarily link to the peak up or down of the market but 
are kind of a stable increase through the years - that doesn't reflect what is the 
situation of the market. 
 
K. So, okay. So your bargaining power is very much linked to ... 
 
F. Yeah, the situation out there and the ability to make sure that there is an 
established minimum, we can build on. 
 
K. Because, that's two different things, it seems like. There's the institutional 
framework and then there is the market. And the market sometimes helps you 
and sometimes is against you. 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. The institutional framework is a more - how do you say - something you 
can build upon. 
 
F. And, you know, much lower pays (...) it's more like it's a sure base - 
wherever you work you have increase of your conditions year after year, quite 
minimum part. If I work here, every year there are negotiations between the 
union and the management here, and, you know, you talk about 0.5 above the 
inflation, 0.5 below the inflation depending on ... so we never get massive ... 
like out there it would be possible, because in here, if the market is very high 
you may get, you may end up with, I don't know, a thousand dollars more in 
your wages. But nine months later you will have 600 dollars. So for anyone in 
the (...) that would be very bad not to have a steady and secure income. 
 
K. Yeah. And you as a union are trying to go more towards the institutional? 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. ... trying to stabilise ... 
 
F. Yeah, to ensure that there is always something ... because I feel that it is a 
misconception that we have fought for for years with the shipowners, with the 
institutions, with the governments. Thinking that some seafarers that come 
from the Philippines have a different need than the one we have. And then 
when you are talking with the Filipinos, they say, you know, I have to pay my 
mortgage every month as we do. I have to pay for education for my kids. My 
kids go to school, they have to pay for school. So they have the same needs 
that we have, while for years people said, oh you live in the Philippines - with 
300 dollars you are very rich. No, it's not like that at all. Yes, you can live 
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maybe in the countryside where you can survive with that amount, but if you 
are seafarer coming from Manilla, you have the same needs that we have. 
Because in the past there were certain nationalities that could come onboard, 
work there for five or six years and make enough money to go back and set up 
a business. But then you have to ask: That is the same that happened to the 
European seafarers that went to sea in the 40s and in the 20s. Go on board, 
make enough money to go back and set up something in Europe. Things have 
changed rapidly, so the need for the Indonesians and Indians are the same 
that we have. So they need to have, like we would like, stability. Because then 
they can support their family. 
 
K. And, just as a final question, the stability ... how much do you work with job 
insurance, like insurance in the case of loss of jobs. Do you have ... is that 
something ... 
 
F. That, not ... 
 
K. ... that's a big part of the ... 
 
F. Not much, because the agreement onboard of the ships, because of the 
international nature of the job, are between the day you sign the agreement 
until the day you sign off from the ship. Then you might go back with the 
same company, but there is no continuity. That is something we have fought 
for for years. Last year we were in Geneva at the ILO, international 
organisation, to finalise the abandonment of maritime labour convention, 
where we managed to secure that the states and shipowners have to have in 
place compulsory insurance to protect the seafarers in case of embarkment 
and repatriation. That was a massive victory, because there are so many 
situations where seafarers, not only were abandoned for six months in a port, 
god knows where, and not paid at all for what they had been working for. So 
now, when a ship will be abandoned, there will be a system that will (...) and 
investigation and if the ship is is deemed to be abandoned, then the insurance 
kicks in, pays the seafarers the repatriation plus four months wages. And then 
they can put (...) the rest of the money (...) when the ship is sold. So in that 
sense, yes, insurance for loss of profession, accident, disability is, but 
compensation for loss of job not yet. 
 
K. Okay. 
 
F. They have - sorry - they have seafarers working for example on ... Danish 
seafarers, rather, European seafarers, working under Danish flag ship, then 
you have a kind of insurance that kicks in if you lose the job ... 
 
K. ... because the European will be covered by Danish law because they are 
part of the European Union? 
 
F. Yeah. 
 
K. Yeah. The Danish welfare system is a big debate in Denmark at the 
moment. 
 
 116 
F. It's a very good one (laughing). 
 
K. Yeah, we would like to share. I don't have anymore questions. 
 
FINISH 
 
